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FINANCING CLINICAL RESEARCH AND
EXPERIMENTAL THIERAPIES:
PAYMENT DUE, BUT FROM WHOM?
PatriciaC. Kuszler °

INTRODUCTION
We live in the age of the possible. It is possible to implant the organ of
a cadaver into the chest of the dying man restoring him to a vigorous
life with a better beating heart.1 It is possible to destroy the bloodmaking marrow of the cancer patient with a near lethal dose of2
chemotherapy, and then rescue her with saved or donated marrow.
And it is possible to tailor a virus to deliver a gene loaded with
instructions for making a missing enzyme to a patient who has a
congenital deficiency. 3 But when do these miraculous possibilities
merit the spending of scarce resources and ever more limited dollars? 4
'Associate Professor, University of Vashington School of Law; Adjunct Aszociate
Professor, University of Washington School of Medicine; Adjunct Associate Profeczor,
University of Washington, School of Public Health and Community Medicine. J.D., Yale Law
School, 1991; M.D, Mayo Medical School, 1978; B.A., Mills College, 1974.
'The first heart transplant was performed in 1967. Since then, the procedure has
changed from a rare, arcane experiment to an established treatment received by approximately
2,300 persons every year. These people would almost certainly die were they not to receive a
donor heart. See Facts about Heart and Heart-lung Transplants, <httpJ/wwv.nhlbi.nh.gov/
healthlpubliclheartlother/hrtlung.pdf_.
'See GAOIHEHS 96-83, Health Insurance-Coverage of Autologous Bone Marrow
Transplantation for Breast Cancer, Apr. 24, 1996.
3
See Joan Stephenson, New Method to Repair Faulty Genes Stirs Interest in
Chimeraplasty Technique, 281 JAMA 119, 120 (1999). Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Gene Patients
Not Told All FactsResearchers Ignore Rules, FDA Says, NEw ORLEAt;s TPIMS-PiCAYtMM, Jan.
27,2000, at Al.
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This question has been sidestepped with increasing frequency over
the last two decades.
Entranced with ever more sophisticated
technology, 5 blessed with a propensi 7 for medical innovation and
unwilling to make difficult decisions, the players in the drama of
clinical research have had little, if any, incentive to draw the hard lines
between that which merits funded investigation and that which is still
unproven speculation. 7 Patients seek new treatments and aggressive

interventions, arguing that even though unproven, they may provide a
"last best chance" for a cure.8 Researchers and physician providers
eagerly advocate for the patients and the proposed therapy, sometimes
without regard to quality and safety. 9 Health plans reluctantly pay for
the experimental treatment, rather than being cast as villains in the

courtroom of mass media.' 0

Plans may pay out of ignorance or

4

See Timothy S. Jost, Health Care Rationing in the Courts: A Comparative Study, 21

HASTINGS INT'L & Cohip. L. REv. 639, 644 (1998).
5

"Americans love technology of any type. Much of this is justified and has led to our
being a world leader in the manufacture and use of technology. It is deeply ingrained into our
culture." Richard. D. Lamm, The Ethics of Excess, PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 218 (May-June
1996).
6
See Ken Terry, Technology: The Biggest Health-care Cost-driver of All, MEDICAL
EcoNoMIcs, Mar. 21, 1994, at 124.

7
Continued spending on research in both public and private sectors reflects Americans'
continued appetite for new medical technology. This appetite remains strong despite the
turmoil within the health care industry over the last several years. See Peter J. Neumann &
Eileen A Sandberg, Trends in Health Care R & D and Technology Innovation, HEALTH AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 111, 118; Mark R. Tonelli, Joshua 0. Benditt, & Richard K. Albert,
ClinicalExperimentation:Lessons from Lung Volume Reduction Surgery, 110 CHFST 230, 235
(1996 Inthe case of high dose chemotherapy with
autologous bone marrow rescue, "women
were being told that the only chance they had in advanced breast cancer was bone marrow
transplantation." Ed Susman, Breast CancerDoctors CallForMore Bone Marrow Transplant

Study. BIOTECH. NEWSWATCH, June 7, 1999, at 12.
9

1t is rare for the marketplace to reject a new technology, regardless of its merit. Home
uterine monitoring is an example of such a technology. It is commonly prescribed for women
at high risk for premature deliveries, despite the fact that there is no evidence that it changes
outcome. One expert obstetrician explained its popularity as "a mixture of companies that wish
to sell their products and physicians who wish to impress their patients." See Terry, supra note
6 at 124. See also Tonelli, supra note 7, at 233 (noting that neither physicians nor patients
appear willing or able to exercise discipline in utilization of unproven therapies and new
technologies).
'°See Michael Parrish, It Could Happen to You, HEALTH, May 15, 1996, at 114; David
Leon Moore, The $89 Million Question-Ethics Pinched the System, Lawyer Says, USA
TODAY, Jan 22, 1996, at ID; Patients are Opting for Unproven Care, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, Oct. 19, 1999, at 15A.
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inability to discern experimental from established therapies, and/or an
inability to distinguish between research protocol-costs and routine
patient care costs which would have been incurred regardless of the
patient's involvement in clinical research."' However, as health care
costs inexorably increase 12 and the demand for evidence-based
justification grows, 13 the difficult question of who should pay for care
that is not yet of proven efficacy will become ever more pressing.
This article will explore the realm of clinical research and the
question of who should finance such research. The first part will define
the various types and levels of clinical research in terms of the
regulatory controls and oversight applied to such research. Then the
article will summarize how the costs of clinical research and
experimental therapies have been covered in the past. Finally, the
article will evaluate the risks and benefits derived by the various
stakeholders and propose a financing rationale for therapies that places
the burden of cost squarely on the stakeholders most likely to benefit.
CLINICAL RESEARCH: DEFINING THE SPECTRUM
Clinical research encompasses a wide range of medical interventions.
The Institute of Medicine (1OM) recently defined clinical research as
including:
9 interventions to prevent, diagnose and treat disease;

"See INsrtruT

OF MEDIcINE, EXTENING MEDICARE REmBURse.iE

IN CmLINIAL

TRLIAS 37 (2000) [hereinafter IOM Report].

12The United States health care system is the most expensive of all the world's systems,
consuming 13.5 percent of the gross domestic product, exceeding a trillion dollars. Although

the double-digit increases of the late 1900s have slowed, costs continue to rise faster than the

rest of the economy. The government's share of the bill was 46 percent in 1997, compared to
40 percent in 1990. In addition, despite the cost of health care, approximately 16.1 percent
(43.4 million persons) of the population has no health insurance. This percentage has
continued to increase over the last several years. See John K Inglehart, The American Health
Care System, 340 NEw. EG. J. MED. 70,72 (1999).
13

See Tonnelli supra note 7, at 233-35 (discussing the importance of justifying new

technologies with objective evidence before allowing them to be unleashed in the market);
Steven H. Woolf, The Need for Perspective in Evidenced-based Medicine, 282 JAMA 2358,

2358 (1999) (favoring a national database compiling information about effective treatments for
specific diseases.)
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" drugs and devices; surgical, manipulative and other
procedures; diagnostic laboratory tests, scans and
examinations; dietary behavioral and psychological
techniques;
" interventions associated with any illnesses or
conditions (not limited to specific ones such as
cancer, AIDS, and heart disease);
" new interventions, as well as "standard"
interventions that have been used in a limited way
(or extensively, but about14which not enough reliable
information is available);
Research typically proceeds through phases of development,
passing developmental milestones along the way.' 5 In its infancy,
clinical research may be merely a clinical innovation, acted upon in the
exigency of a crisis or void, with no underlying study protocol or
regulatory oversight.' 6 If the innovation develops into legitimate
research, it will be enveloped within a study regimen or protocol.' 7 At
the early stages, study protocols usually focus on the safety of the new
18
drug, device or procedure using a single group of research subjects.
Such "single arm" trials generally are followed by more extensive
studies that measure the experimental intervention against alternative
therapies and/or involve a rudimentary comparison between
experimental and "control" subject groups.' As the research further
matures, the new intervention will be tested in a double-blind
4
See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 3.
15 Research is described in federal regulations as "systematic investigation designed to
develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge." See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e) (1999).
Typically, research begins with animal studies, then continues with several phases of clinical
trials using human subjects. See discussion infra, at p. 443.
167See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 3.
1 See Dale L. Moore, An IRB Member's Perspective on Access to Innovative Therapy, 57

ALB. L. REV. 559, 562 (1994).

18See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 15-16; MICHL.um J. MALiNOWsKI, BIOTECHNOLOGY:
LAW Busn'Ess & REGULATION 11-18-11-19 (1999).

19See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 15-16; MALiNOwsI, supra note 18, at 11-18-11-
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randomized study, the so-called "gold-standard" of research2 0 Finally,
the therapy will become a recognized standard of care.2
In some areas, such as the testing and development of new drugs,
biologics, and medical devices, research can be easily categorized in

terms of its stage of development because it is governed by a defined
federal regulatory regimen.2 However, in other areas, notably nev
procedures, there is no direct federal regulation, and oversight is
limited to that administered byT Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) or
human subjects committees.'
In addition, there is a category of

"research" that is totally unregulated and largely unmonitored. This is
the use of an innovative, unproven therapy, usually a procedure, to
provide a "last best chance" for apatient who is dying or suffering with

an incurable debilitating disease. 24 Such "last best chance" therapies
may or may not be administered under a research protocol and may or
20

See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 17. See generallyROBERT J. LEmN, ETwics Aim
(2d ed. 1986); Samuel Hellman & Deborah Hellman, Of
Mice, But Not Men: Problems of the Randomized Clinical Trial,324 Nmv ENG. J.Mm. 1525,
1585 (1991) (discussing physician's ethical obligation to patients in a double-blind study);
Jennifer Kulynuch, Will FDA Relinquish the "Gold Standard" for New Drug Approval?
Redefining "Substantial Evidence" in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997. 54 FOOD, AND
DRuG L4, 127 (1999) (discussing the onerous and costly nature of the requisite "gold
standard").
21
With drugs and devices, this stamp of approval is provided by the Food and Drug
Administration. In the case of procedures, graduation to an accepted standard of care is
murkier and is determined by peer reviewed medical journals, treatis, and occasionally, the
REGuLATiON OF CUiCAL REsEARCH

courts.

22See discussion, infra, at p. 449 (discussing the role of Food and Drug Administration in
the premarket approval of pharmaceutical drug, medical devices and biologics).
23Any procedure that is being studied in a clinical trial funded through the federal
government is required to comply with human subjects protections and must be approved by
the IRB before the study is undertaken. However, use of an experimental procedure outside the
context of a study protocol is not subject to such review and or monitoring. See discussion,
infra, at24p. 450.
Procedures are susceptible to no legal requirements of safety and efficacy; nor do they
have to be superior or equal to other alternatives in order to be used by practitioners. Indeed
many procedures and medical interventions already well inculcated in health care have never
been critically evaluated for evidence of safety or effectiveness. See IOM Report, supra note
11, at 4. In the case of high dose chemotherapy and bone marrow transplant for treatment of
breast cancer, patients flocked to medical centers believing that the therapy was their only
hope, despite the fact that its efficacy was unknown. The fact that such experimental
procedures are unregulated and subject to no approval process, such as that applied to
pharmaceuticals, allowed rapid market dispersion of an unproven, risky procedure. See Gina
Kolata & Kurt Eichenwald, PatientsSkip ClinicalTrials,Buy Treatments, Portland Oregonian,
Oct. 5, 1999, atA6.
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25
may not adhere to established research principles and study design.
Indeed, the Institute of Medicine has pointedly excluded new
interventions that might be adopted by practitioners treating patients
outside of a research protocol from their definition of "clinical
research., 26 Such interventions are considered to be in the earliest
phase of innovation and not yet sufficiently developed to be recognized
as "clinical research." 27

Clinical Research in the Context of the
Federal Regulatory Regimen
Much of clinical research is susceptible to federal regulation-either
under the aegis of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), or both.28 The FDA provides an
elaborate and detailed set of developmental milestones for new drugs,
devices and biologics. 29 Indeed, many argue the process for research
and complex
and development prescribed by the FDA is so onerous
30
therapies.
new
useful
of
dissemination
that it thwarts
The FDA approves and regulates drugs using one process
mandated by the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FD&C Act),3 ' medical
devices by another, the Medical Devices Act of 1976 (MDA),32 and
biologics such as vaccines by a third-the Public Health Services

25See Dale L. Moore, Recurrent Issues in the Review of Medical Research on Human

Subjects,
26 I ALB. L.J. SC. & TEcH. 1, 5 (1991).

See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 3.
See id.
28
See Alan Kaplan, 50 Years of Drug Amendments Revisions, in Easy-to-Swallow
Capsule Form, 50 FOOD & DRUGL. J. 179, 179-81 (1995).
"gSee
id.
30
27

See Carolyn Lockhead, A Deadly Over-Caution: FDA Assailed for Slow Testing of

New Drugs, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1992, at Al.
3'21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1994). The 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FD&C)

superseded the Food and Drug Act of 1906, expanding the scope of product regulation
dramatically. The 1938 Act imposed requirements upon drug manufacturers to file a new drug

application before they marketed their products to the public. A series of amendments have
modified and further expanded the scope of the 1938 Act, usually enacted in response to the
expanding frontiers of science. These range from amendments added in 1941 to address a new

biologic, insulin, to the Prescription Drug User and Generic Drug Enforcement Acts of 1992.
Throughout its long history, the FDA has focused on regulating food and drug manufacturing
to ensure safety and effectiveness. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 182-85.
32
See 21 U.S.C. § 360 (1994).
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(PHS) Act.3 3 Moreover, in some cases-typically with biological
products-when the FDA exerts authority over the product, compliance
with both the PHS provisions and FD&C provisions is required.3
Regulation of New Drugs and Pharmaceuticals

In the case of new drugs wending their way through the research
pipeline, the FDA has rigorous safety and effectiveness standards
guaranteed by a lengthy four-stage approval process.3 s This FDA
regimen proceeds from an initial pre-clinical testing phase performed
on animal subjects, 36 followed by an investigational new drug (IND)
application requiring three phases of clinical research using human

subjects.37 These clinical trials must comply with human subjects
protections and be approved by an IRB. 3s The most recent generic
version of federal human subject protections is the "Common Rule,"
which has been adopted in a modified version by the FDA. 9

33See
42 U.S.C. § 262 (1994).
34
For discussion of the relationship and interplay between the FD&C Act and the Public
Health Service Act provisions, see Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological Drug Regulation:
Past, Present,and Beyond the Year 2000, 50 FOOD & DRUG L. L 123 (1995). Korwek notes
that biologies products are simultaneously either biologics and drugs or biologies and devices
under existing law; thus the major distinction is whether or not the contemplated product is a
biologic; if so, it will be susceptible to two sets of regulatory requirements. Id at 128. Adding
another layer of complication is the fact that within the regulatory bureaucracy, ccparate
regulatory centers deal with different FDA products. Drugs are evaluated by the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) and biologies by the Center for Biologics Evaluation
and Research (CBER). See Gary E. Gamerman, Regulation of Biologics ,amfacturing:
Questioningthe Premise,49 FoOD & DRuGL. J. 213,213-16 (1994).
3"See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1994).
36See id
37
See id.
3
SIn order to pass IRB muster, the proposed research must minimize the risks to subjects
use procedures that are consistent with sound research design, and whenever possible, ba
administered in the context of diagnosis and treatment purposes. Sce 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)
(1997). In addition, the risk to the subject should be reasonable in relation to the importance of
the knowledge that is likely to result. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(2) (1997). Sec also HHS Fact
Sheet: ProtectingResearch Subjects, December 22, 1999, <http'l/waisgate.hhs.gov.> Sec also
discussion on institutional review boards and human subjects protection% infra, at p. 450.
39See 56 Fed. Reg. 28012 (June 18, 1991). The Food and Drug Administration has
adopted a modified version of the Common Rule, see 21 C.F.R. Parts 50 and 56. The Common
Rule has been adopted by numerous other government agencies sponsoring research, notably
the Department of Health and Human Services, see 45 C.F.R. Part 46 (1997).
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In Phase I trials, the new drug is administered to a small group of

healthy research subjects. 40 This early phase is designed to determine
the chemical action of the drug, its safety and acceptable dosage

range. 41 Phase II will involve a larger number of subjects who are
usually patients being treated for the disorder that the drug is being

developed to treat. 42 During this phase, researchers will elicit more
discrete and detailed information about the effects of the proposed drug

treatment; there is often some comparison between different study
groups. 43 Finally, Phase III will compare the new drug with accepted
alternatives or a placebo. 44 During Phase 111, the standard is a
randomized trial with experimental and control arms, usually involving
a large number of subjects. 45 Phase III seeks to develop detailed
information regarding both the safety and efficacy of the new drug as
compared to existing accepted therapies. 46 The accumulated data is

then submitted to the FDA in a new drug application (NDA) for
evaluation, review and additional safety and effectiveness testing prior
to FDA approval.47 This process routinely takes a decade or more to
complete and is extremely costly for the pharmaceutical

manufacturer. 48 Post approval, Phase IV commences; it consists of
40
See
41

MALINOWSKI, supranote 18, at 11-19.
See id; IOM Report, supra note 11, at 16.
42As such, the subjects are simultaneously patients. It is not infrequent for Phase I and II
to be collapsed into a single phase. See 21 C.F.R. § 321. 21 (1994). See also MALINoWSKI,
supranote
18, at 11-19.
43
See. MALINOWSK, supranote 18, at 11-19.
44See
id
4
Thus, the patient persona of the subject will not necessarily receive a "treatment." This
is cited as one of the primary reasons for difficulties in enrolling patients in Phase III trials, See
GAO/HEHS 99-182, NIH Clinical Trials-Various Factors Affect Patient Participation, Sept.
30, 1999.
46See MALINowsKI, supranote 18, at 11-19; IOM Report, supra note 11, at 16.
47
See MAUNOWSKI, supra note 18, at 11-19.
48
The delays and time required in the current process are inextricably linked with cost.
Industry experts report that taking the average drug from laboratory to market costs $400
million and requires 15 years. See John F. Niback, Why Are Drug Development Programs
Growing in Size and Cost? A View from the Industry, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 181 (1997).
Moreover, they estimate that 90 percent of the average cost is secondary to the regulatory
delays. See Tanya Karwaki, The FDA and the Biotechnology Industry: A Symbiotic
Relationship,71 WASH. L. REv. 821, 828-29 (1996); Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and
"Privatization"--TheDrugApproval Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 203, 212 (1995); Julie
C. Relihan, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS Drugs: An InternationalApproach, 13 B.U.
INT'L L. J. 229, 237 (1995).
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post-marketing
surveillance and monitoring of the 4rug's safety and
49
efficacy.
Regulation of Medical Devices
After a decade of somewhat bizarre efforts to classify certain devices as

drugs in order to bring them under the FDA's more global regulatory
umbrella,50 the MDA replaced what had been after-the-fact regulation
of already marketed devices with premarket review and approval. 5 '

The MDA put in place a three-level classification system for
medical devices and a regulatory regimen applicable to each of the
classifications. 52 Class I devices are those for which safety and
efficacy can be reasonably ensured by existing controls upon labeling
and adherence to good manufacturing requirements.5

Class II devices

are those meeting Class I standards plus additional special control
standards? 4 Class I devices are those that require a full pre-market
clearance process, with presentation and review of clinical
research
55
documenting the safety and effectiveness of the new device.
49

See Relihan, supra note 48, at 236-39 (1995); John P. Dillman, PrescriptionDrug
Approval and Terminal Diseases:Desperate Times Require DesperateMeasures 44 VAID. L.
REv. 925,928 (1991).
50
Without having statutory pre-market authority over medical devices and confronted
with an increasing number of invasive technologies such as pacemakers, the FDA attempted to
classify them as drugs. For example, suture material as well as implantable drug sensitivity
disks were both deemed to be "drugs." See AMP, Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir.
1968); 51United States v. An Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784,798 (1969).
Although medical devices did come under the authority of the FDA to some degree in
the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the scope of this authority was limited to labeling
requirements and removal from the market of adulterated or unsanitary devices. See Rodney R.
Munsey, Trends and Events in FDA Regulation ofMedical Devices Over the Last Fifjy Years,
50 FOOD & DRUGL. J. 163, 167-68 (1995).
52
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (1994).
5Class I devices must be manufactured by a FDA registered manufacturer, comply with
Good Manufacturing Practice regulations, and be labeled in such a way that they are not
misleading or false in any way. See id See also Jay M. Zitter, What is "Device" Within
Meaning ofFederalFood,Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 321 (H), 129 A.L.R. Fed. 343
(1996).

9These special controls include performance standard% requirements for patient
registries, and post-market surveillance of the device. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (1994).
55
Class I devices are those whose reasonable safety and effectiveness can be a-ured
only through compliance with a premarket clearance process. About 8 percent of regulated
devices fall into class IL With respect to class M type devices that predated the MPA, the
intent was to gradually retrospectively qualify them. See Munsey, supranote 51, at 163.
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Obviously, because the medical device industry was fairly well
developed by 1976-such devices as pacemakers, artificial heart valves
and jaw implants were already common-the MDA had to distinguish
S6
these already marketed devices from those to come in the future.
After the implementation of the MDA, makers of devices purporting to
meet Class I or Class II standards were required to submit to the FDA a
510(k) notification showing that the new product was substantially
equivalent to an older Class I or Class II product. 57 Most of the
medical devices of the late twentieth century are not Class I or Class II
devices; instead they are high technology5 Class III devices, such as
insulin pumps or implantable defibrillators. 8
These new Class III type devices may pursue one of three courses
to attain FDA authorization for marketing. They may apply for FDA
clearance as a product which is "substantially equivalent" to another
Class III product already marketed-the pre-market notification or the
510(k) route.5 9 This requires the manufacturer to notify the FDA of the
60
new product's substantial equivalence and present a modicum of data.
However, the 510(k) process does not require the rigorous de novo
demonstration of safety and effectiveness that new devices not
substantially equivalent to an already marketed Class III device must
meet.6 ' The 510(k) route was extensively utilized after enactment of
the MDA in 1976.62
In the case of a novel, not-substantially equivalent product, the
manufacturer must seek pre-marketing approval (PMA) from the

6
See
57

id.
See id.

"8See id.

See id. at 166.
6See Munsey, supranote 51, at 166.
6t

Because the full pre-market approval process is so onerous, the 510(k) route to market
is preferred by manufacturers if the new device can be credibly proclaimed "substantially
equivalent" to an earlier similar device. The 510(k) process requires only limited presentation

of clinical trial evidence. The 510(k) method was particularly favored prior to 1990. Until
1990, the FDA allowed piggybacking of section 510(k)s-that is Product B could state it was
substantially equivalent to pre-76 Product A; then Product C could get a 510(k) on the ground
that it was substantially equivalent to Product B; and so on. Obviously with incremental
changes, by the time you get out to Product Z, the differences between A and Z could be

relatively
62 dramatic. See id. at 169.
See id.
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FDA.63 A PMA is essentially a product license from the FDA
imposing precise conditions upon the manufacturing and labeling of the
device, which serves to justify the FDA's approval of the device as safe
Like the NDA, the PMA process is rigorous, time
and effective.'
consuming and expensive.65 In the course of the PMA process,
scientific evidence accumulated from controlled clinical trials must
verify the safety and effectiveness of the device.6 6 The medical device
clinical trial process mimics that applied to drugs. However, the
evidence that may be used to prove that the device is effective
encompasses a broader scope of research than is generally allowed in
validating pharmaceuticals. 67 Nevertheless, simple case reports,
anecdotal 68evidence and mere opinion are not considered appropriate
evidence.
The third method by which a product may be used in the market is
by an investigational device exemption.69 This classification, instituted
human subjects
in 1980, requires FDA approval and compliance with
70
studies.
clinical
in
used
are
devices
protections when
The late 1980s brought increasing dissatisfaction with medical
device regulation and the FDA and its Center for Devices and
Radiological Health (CDRH).71 This stimulated legislation which
eventually was enacted as the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990
(SMDA). 72 The SMDA was designed to increase the FDA's postmarket tracking of devices in all categories, including those marketed
prior to 1976.73 It also tightened the requirements for 510(k)

6'See id
66See id

'The process includes the participation of numerous outside experts and careful review
of the scientific data and studies showing the safety and efficacy of the device. Sce Munzy,
supranote 51, at 166.
6SSee 21 C.F.R § 860.7(c)(2) (1997). See 21 C.F.R § 814.20(b)(3)(B) (1997).

'For example, evidence used in qualifying a device may come from controlled zcientific
trials, but may also come from other "valid scientific evidence" that s7ea.ks to the effietivene s
of the device.
See Munsey, supra note 51, at 166.
6

'See 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(c)(2) (1997); 21 C.F.R. § 314.20 (b)(3)(B)(1997).
See Munsey, supra note 51, at 166-69.

69
70

See iii
This criticism focused on PMA delays, lax reporting of adverse events, and slovness in
developing standards for devices. See id at 171.
See 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b) (1994).
7See Munsey, supranote 51, at 172.
71
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notification, making this route to market less feasible, thus forcing
"new" devices to seek a full PMA.74
As a result of the MDA and subsequent SMDA, the regulatory
75
regimen for medical devices is increasingly similar to that for drugs.
76
Manufacturers are held to strict safety and manufacturing standards.
In the case of novel, not "substantially equivalent" devices, rigorous
clinical trials and presentation of evidence obtained from them must be
reviewed and evaluated by the FDA before the device may be
marketed."
Regulation ofBiologics and Vaccines
Yet another set of medical products that is regulated by the FDA is
biologics. 78 The statutory provisions governing biologics like vaccines
actually predate the 1906 Food and Drug Act. Congress took action
to regulate such biologics in 1902 after a number of highly publicized
deaths resulted from contaminated diphtheria vaccine. 0 Despite the
early legislative action and statutory authority, regulation of biologics
was largely unenforced until the 1950s.81 Today, however, biologics
regulation is a complex maze of requirements and licensure designed to
82
assure safe and unadulterated biologics products.
The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER)
reviews the safety and efficacy of biologics, monitors clinical testing of
74The SMDA essentially closed the sequential "piggy-backing" loophole that evolved
after the passage of the Medical Devices Act. See id.
75
See J. Matthew Buchanan, Medical Device Patent Rights in the Age of FDA
Modernization: The PotentialEffect of Regulatory Streamliningon the Right to Exclude, 30 U.

TOL. L. REv. 305, 310 (1999).
76

7

See id at 305.

' See
78

id

Biologics include: vaccines, viruses, therapeutic serums, toxins, antitoxins, blood,
blood component or derivatives, and allergenic products. See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1994).

Excluded are antibiotics and hormones (usually regulated as drugs). See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355-357
(199.5igSee Gamerman,
supranote 34, at 215.
0
See
Philip D. Noguchi, From Jim to Gene and Beyond: An Odyssey of Biologics
Regulation, 51 FooD & DRUG L.J. 367, 368 (1996).

81
See
82

Gamerman, supranote 34, at 218.
This includes regulations defining what constitutes "manufacturing," which activities
require an establishment license, compliance with one or two forms of manufacturing
arrangements, and strong FDA preference for integrated manufacturing. See Gamerman, supra

note 34, at 221.
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biological products, establishes product standards, conducts some
specialized research, and administers the licensing of blood banks and
vaccine manufacturers. 83 Ultimately biologies research culminates in a
biologics license application (BLA), the biologics analog of the NDA
for drugs.84 This BLA process represents a streamlining of the
biologics approval process resulting from the FDA Modernization Act
of 1997.85 Nevertheless, like drug and device regulation, biologies
of safety and efficacy generated through
regulation requires evidence
86
trials.
clinical
reproducible
In sum, the FDA has detailed an extraordinarily risk-averse
regulatory scheme for pharmaceutical drugs, medical devices and
biologics.8 7 These products cannot be marketed by manufacturers
without FDA approval. 8 Regardless of whether the new therapy is
susceptible to regulation as a drug, a device or biologic, the FDA
prescribes discrete stages of research prior to FDA approval and
authorization for marketing. 9 Each stage is replete with requirements
for up-front evaluation of study protocols, oversight by IRBs, analysis
and peer review of research results, and careful determination of safety
and efficacy standards. 90 Thus, the developmental steps in bringing a
new drug, device or biologic from research to market are easily defined
and documented. Unfortunately, there is no parallel process for new
treatment procedures.
Procedures: The Unregulated Frontier in Clinical Research
In contrast to drugs, devices and biologics, procedures are not subject
to dedicated federal regulation. 91 Nevertheless, some clinical research
'3See lMinNOWSKI, supranote 18, at 11-15
84

See id

'See FDA Modernization Act (FDAMA) Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat 2296 See. 210
(1997). Prior to the BLA, biologics products were required to obtain both a product license
application (PLA) and an establishment license application (ELA). Sce MAIMLOMAM, supra
note 18, at 11-16.
8Ssee MALnOWSKI, supra note 18, at 11-21
7See id
8Ssee id

89See id
9°See id

91See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 4. Many scholars argue that the lax standard

applied to procedures versus that applied to drugs is not only inconsistent and detrimental to
scientific evaluation, but is unethical. See Tonelli, supranote 7, at 230. Similarly in the caze
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involving procedures is funded with government grant money, usually
through the NIH. 92 Because of this federal funding, the research is
required to comply with federal regulations protecting human subjects
and oversight by an IRB. 93
Institutional Review Boards:
SafeguardingResearch Using Human Subjects
IRBs or Human Subjects Committees are charged with protecting
human subjects who are enrolled in federally funded or sponsored

research. 94 The IRB is composed of not only researchers, but several
other classes of members designated by federal regulation. 95 The
constitution of the committee 96
is designed to provide a global and
research.
the
of
unbiased review
97
The IRB's primary focus is the safeguarding of human subjects.
It will evaluate the proposed research project with respect to methods
of subject recruitment and evaluate the risks and benefits of the
research for the subject.98 The IRB will review and verify that the

of the HDC/ASCR treatment for breast cancer, oncologists promoted the unproven treatment
with complete impunity. Indeed, even the American Society of Clinical Oncology was
emphatically touting the therapy as superior as early as 1992. See Napoli, supra note 148.
2Drug and device research may also be subject to NIH requirements if the research is
federally funded rather than funded by the private sector. The NIH, its companion institutes,
and various bureaus address a broad scope of research, including cancer (National Cancer
Institute (NCI)), heart disease (National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute), and mental health
and substance abuse (Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA)).
See INsTrTTE OF MEICnm, FUNDING HEALTH SCENCEs RESEARCH 37-38 (1996) [hereinafter
Funding Health Sciences Research]. In addition, numerous other federal entities sponsor
medical research and clinical trials, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), Centers
for Disease Control (CDC), the Department of Veteran's Affairs, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of Defense. See id. at 38-47.
93
See 45 C.F.Rt § 46 (1997); JEREMY SUGARMAN, ANNA C. MAsTROIANNI, JEFFREY P,
KAHN, ETHICS OF RESEARCH wITH HUMAN SUBJECTs: SELECTED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 33
(1998); Mary Terrell White, Guidelinesfor IRB Review ofInternationalCollaborativeMedical
Research:A Proposal,27 J. L. MED. & ETHICs 87, 87 (1999).
94See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1997).
95
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (1997).
96'The regulations take great care to ensure that the committee will be balanced in terms
of gender, profession, and affiliation. IRB members are foreclosed from participating in review
of any project or study in which they have a conflicting interest. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107 (b)(e) (1997).
97
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1997).
93
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (a)(3) (1997).
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consent document is fully informative, unambiguous, and
comprehensible to the subject. 99 IRBs seek to minimize risks to
subjects, guard privacy and confidentiality, ensure good study design,
and foster research that maximizes benefit to the individual subject
while advancing the frontiers of research.l0
Federal law requires that all research that is funded or sponsored
by federal dollars must be approved by the IRB before it is
undertaken. 10 1 In addition, most universities and medical research
centers require that all research, regardless of funding source, comply
with federal human subjects requirements. 1°2
The federal regulations protecting human subjects thus capture
another category of research-new procedures that are being
researched with federal funding or in an institution that is subject to the
federal human subjects regulations.1 0 3 This allows for such research to
be designated as clinical research under an evaluated and IRBauthorized study protocol.' 0 4 Such clinical trials of procedures will
seek to verify that the new procedure is safe and effective. 5 Also, the
clinical trials will attempt to show that the new procedure is better than,
or at least equivalent to, the established procedures used in treatment of
the malady. I1 6 This legitimate research will be informally classed as
consistent with the vernacular
Phase I, Phase II, or Phase III to10 be
7
applied to pharmaceutical research.
However, IRB review and monitoring does not apply to
experimental medical innovations that are not part of an established
protocol or merely defined as "research" by the provider.OS These new
procedures range from the well-accepted not-so-new, but untested
99See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1997).
l°°See 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 1(a) (1997).
'0°See 45 C.F.R- § 46.103(b) (1997).
1
()See Moore, supra note 17, at 560. Indeed, most large universities and centers have

obtained a multiple project assurance (MPA) that governs both federally and non-federally
funded research. See SuGAR AN, supra note 93, at 33.
' 03See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1999). These clinical trials are subject to IRB funding by

virtue of their federal funding or sponsorship, rather than on the basis of their need for federal
approval prior to being authorized for marketing. See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 22-23.
104See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 15.
'05See id at 16.
'O'See
id at 22-23.
107See id at 17.

103See Tonelli, supra note 7, at 230.
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innovations 109 to new "last best hope" procedures directed at a dying
patient who has failed to respond to accepted, conventional
treatment."10 The latter captures headlines and sparks emotion, and has
generated much of the controversy with respect to funding of
"research."111
Experimental Procedures and Treatments:
Innovation as a Last Resort
Despite our technologic achievements, medicine and science continues
to be bedeviled by stubborn challenges like AIDS and common cancers
that are resistant to all our weapons." 2 Often the victims of these
stubborn killers are young, sick, desperate and out of options.

Innovative treatments, even those of unproven value, are a powerful
lure for these patients, their families, and their health care providers. 113
Often, these treatments are not part of a legitimate research trial" l4 and
do not qualify for funding as such, nor are1 they established treatments
eligible for coverage by third party payers. s
1'9See Eddie Gibb, Just Chew It, SUNDAY HERALD, Jan. 9, 2000, at 16 (discussing use of
St. John's Wort for depression); Sheila Anne Feeney, The Agony of Acne, THE ILWAUKE
JouRNAL SENinmz, March 6, 2000, at GI (discussing the well-advertised use a of specific birth
control pill to improve acne).
"°There are numerous accounts of such cases in the lay press. In one reported case, the
patient's husband described his wife's long and torturous death from breast cancer, during
which she chose twice to undergo high dose chemotherapy and autologous bone marrow
transplant, knowing that it was unproven and unlikely to work. Her husband, a physician, was
incredulous when the doctors were willing to perform the second transplant. See Judy
Foreman, Marrow Transplants Falling Short of a Miracle-Efficacy Against Brecast Cancer
Unclear,BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 3, 1999, at B1.
.'See id
12AIDS and Breast Cancer, both highly visible and well-publicized killers, are the two
top recipients of federal grant money. Awarded $1.4 billion and $381.9 million respectively in
fiscal year 1996, they receive a share of research funds that is out of proportion with disabilityadjusted life years that they take. See Katharine Webster, AIDS, Breast Cancer Research Get
Most FederalFunding,PATRIOT LEDGER, June 18, 1999, at 11.

'"See Foreman, supra note 110, at B1.
14Notwithstanding the fact that the treatment is not part of a legitimate trial and not
compliant with human subjects protections required of legitimate research, entrepreneurial
providers often do describe their services as a "clinical trials program." This marketing tool
has been to used to the advantage of Response Oncology, a for-profit chain offering high dose
chemotherapy and stem cell rescue to cancer patients. Despite the label, the program
administered the procedure to all patients without any guise of a scientific protocol or study in
place. See Kolata & Eichenwald, supra note 24, at A6.
..See id
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One such common cancer that has proven recalcitrant to treatment
is breast cancer. Afflicting one in every eight women, 1 6 the incidence
of breast cancer has remained relatively constant since the turn of the
last century." 7 Although it increases in incidence with age, many of its
victims are not old but are in the prime of their lives.", Worse still,
many of these young breast cancer patients 19have particularly virulent
forms of the disease and a dismal prognosis.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the search for better breast cancer
treatments led to increased use of chemotherapy, both in terms of drugs
utilized and dosages administered.120 The limiting factor was believed
to be the deadly effect of higher chemotherapy doses on the patient's
bone marrow.II The drugs would virtually decimate the marrow,
leaving the patient with numerous toxic side effects.122 Researchers
sought to curtail these severely adverse side effects by re-infusing
harvested bone marrow to rescue the patient after high dose
chemotherapy. 123
These autologous bone marrow transplants
(ABMT),12 and the subsequent improved procedure, autologous stem
cell rescue (ASCR),'25 were seized upon by physicians and patients
alike as26 a new, more aggressive, treatment for advanced breast
cancer. 1

16This equates to approximately 44,000 deaths from the disease every year. See Sandra
G. Boodman, Breast CancerRoulette, WASH. POST, Apr. 27 1999, at Z12.
" 7See Bernard Fisher, et al., Neoplasms of the Breast in CACER Mwicunm 2349, 2380
(James F. Holland et al., eds., Williams & Wilkins, 1998).
"'See id
" 9See id
12°See J. Zujewski, A. Nelson & J. Abrams, Much Ado About Not Enough Dta: High
Dose Chemotherapywith Autologous Stem Cell Rescuefor Breast Cancer, 90J. NAT'L CANCER
INsnTuTE
2 200, 200-08 (1998) [hereinafter Zujewski.].
1'
See id
2'2See id
123See American Society of Clinical Oncology, 7he Role of High Dose Chemocherapy
and Bone Marrow Transplant or PeripheralStem-Cell Support in the Treatment of Breast
Cancer:Background andPreliminaryResults ofFive Studies Presentedat the ASCO's Annual
Meeting, May 15-18, in Atlanta, GA, <http'Jlwvw.asco.org> [hereinafter ASCO].
124
See id.
12In the autologous bone marrow procedure, stems cells are withdraivn from the
marrow, frozen and then later reinfused into the patient. In the peripheral stem cell procedure,
the stem cells are forced out of the marrow with medication into the peripheral blood stream
where they can be retrieved by a simple blood draw. The later improvement spares the patient
an invasive bone marrow aspiration for initial harvesting of marrow cells. Sce id

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:441

Despite fervent belief in these therapies, there was little research
demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the procedures. 127 Indeed, the
tremendous demand for the procedure resulted in its rapid adoption by

a market of young, desperate breast cancer patients who saw the high
dose chemotherapy (HDC) followed by either autologous bone marrow
transplant (RDC/ABMT) or high dose chemotherapy followed by

either autologous
stem cell rescue (IDC/ASCR) as a last chance for a
28
cure. 1

This final chance had a high price tag, both in terms of morbidity
and mortality, as well as dollars. The procedure was and is expensive,
costing at least $100,000 and often twice that. 129 The toxicity of the
drugs results in life-threatening infections, bleeding disorders, organ
dysfunction, severe skin rashes and allergic reactions, severe nausea
and gastrointestinal problems, and numerous other adverse side
effects. 3 0 Death as a result of the therapy occurred in up to 20 percent
of cases, although experience with the procedure has dropped the
mortality rate significantly.131
'26See Kolata & Eiehenwald, supra note 24, at A6. See also Sandra G. Boodman, New
Breast CancerStudies Blunt Hope-Bone Marrow Transplant No Wonder Cure, New Orleans
Times-Picayune, May 2, 1999, at A24 ("Four of five studies involving 2,000 women found that
for those newly diagnosed with aggressive cancers or for those whose cancers have recurred
and spread far outside the breast, transplants appear to be no better than conventional
chemotherapy in prolonging life").
127See ASCO, supra note 123. See also Scott Gottlieb, Bone Marrow TransplantsDo
Not Help in Breast Cancer, 170 WEsT. J. MED. 376, 380 (1999) ("Preliminary results released
early from 4 ongoing clinical studies of breast cancer treatments indicate that high-dose
chemotherapy followed by bone marrow transplantation may not significantly improve
survival, although positive results from a fifth trial, also released early, seem to suggest
otherwise").
'2Approximately 30,000 women are believed to have received high dose chemotherapy
and autologous/stem cell rescue, although only a small fraction of them were enrolled in
legitimate trials. See Patients Are Optingfor Unproven Care, OMAHA WORLD-HEALD, Oct.
10, 1999, at 15A. See also Kolata & Eichenwald, supra note 24, at A6 (calling experimental
treatments a "growing business").
'29See Bruce E. Hillner, Thomas J. Smith & Christopher Desch, Efficacy and Cost
Effectiveness of Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation in Metastatic Breast Cancer:
Estimates Using Decision Analysis While Awaiting Clinical Trial Results, 267 JAMA 2055,
2055 (1992).
130See Zujewski, supra note 120, at 200-08.
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Market adoption was not hindered by lack of FDA approval
because, as a procedure, HDC/ASCR was not susceptible to any
regulatory approval. 132 IRBs reviewed the treatment protocols for
adequate human subjects protections in only a small fraction of
cases.' 33 Of the 12,000-30,000 women in the United States who
underwent HDC/ASCR, only about one thousand of them are believed
to have been enrolled in a legitimate clinical trial.'34
Because of the uncontrolled access to the procedure, outcome and
reliable research data were slow to emerge.' 3 5 Indeed, only a few
randomized controlled clinical trials comparing HDC/ASCR with
conventional chemotherapy have been undertaken. 36 In retrospect, the
fervent adoption of the HDC/ASCR procedure for breast cancer
treatment actually undermined efforts to accrue 1reliable
data, thus
37
efficacy.
and
safety
its
of
slowing the determination

It was not until mid-1999 that preliminary results of a body of
research were released by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and
unveiled at a meeting of the prestigious American Society of Clinical
Oncology (ASCO). 138 These results were drawn from five randomized
3
1'
Mortality rates during the early years of doing the procedures were as high as 20
percent. Current mortality from the therapy is believed to be about 5 percent so long as the
therapy is provided in a center experienced in doing the procedure. However, in the largest
randomized trial to date mortality for high dose chemotherapy was 7.9 percent. Se ASCO,
supranote 123.
12
See id
133See GAOIHEHS 96-83 supra note 2; Zujewski, supra note 120, at 200-03; Sandra G.
Boodman, Breast CancerRoulette, WASH. PosT. Apr. 27, 1999, at Z12.
'3Because of the uncontrolled market adoption, it is impossible to know how many
women have received the procedure. See Patients Are Opting for Unproven Care, Not
Scientific
Study, OAIAHA WoRm-HERALD, Oct. 10, 1999, at 15A.
135See GAO/HEHS 96-83, supra note 2; Zujewek<i, supra note 120, at 200-OS;
Boodman, supra note 116, at Z12.
136See ASCO, supra note 123.
137Several advocates and researchers have opined that had bone marrow transplant been
provided in clinical trials rather than on the basis of ad hoe demand, researchers would have
had answers to questions of safety and efficacy years ago. See Boodman, supra note 133, at
Z12. 38
1 See ASCO, supra note 123; the results were initially displayed on the Web due to
pressure exerted by patients and doctors, and release was preceded by a meeting at the National
Cancer Institute focusing on how to release the disappointing data given the public investment
in the procedures. See Judy Foreman, When Hopes Run Ahead ofFacts, MIaS. STAR-TRIBTN,
Apr. 4, 1999, at 3E; Michael Waldholz, Breast Cancer Studies Question Bone Tran.plants,
WAIL. ST. L, Apr. 16, 1999, at B7.
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clinical trials, two of which involved subjects with advanced metastatic

breast cancer 139 and three involving
subjects with breast cancer that had
140
nodes.
lymph
spread to multiple
Four studies, including the largest randomized trial, found no
significant difference between I-DC/ASCR and conventional
chemotherapy. 14 1 In one study, 7.4 percent of patients in the
HDC/ASCR arm of the study died, as compared to no deaths in the
conventional chemotherapy "control" group. 142 This study was
conducted at several large academic medical centers where researchers
were highly skilled in the procedure, and the study's principal
investigator 143
was one of the most vociferous proponents of
HDC/ASCR'

One of the five studies showed fewer cancer relapses and lower
mortality in the HDC/ASCR arm of the study.' 44 This study,
performed in South Africa with a relatively small sample of subjects,
was expected to bolster the belief that the HDC/ASCR procedure was a
worthwhile treatment. 145 However, some argued that the two arms of
the study were unbalanced in terms of prognostic factors, and the nonHDC "control" group did not receive conventional chemotherapeutic
regimens. 146 These criticisms prompted
a review and verification of the
147
paper.
the
of
presentation
results after
139 0ne of these studies was done at the University of Pennsylvania with 553 initial

subjects, but only 199 patients finished the trial. The remaining 354 either chose not to be
randomized or were found ineligible on the basis of their disease status. The other study was
done in Paris
with only 61 subjects. See ASCO, supra note 123.
0

140ne of the high-risk primary breast cancer studies was done in the United States; 783
women participated in the study. Another study was done in Sweden with 525 subjects. The
third wast done in South Africa and involved only 154 subjects. See ASCO, supra note 123.
14See id.
42
1 See id (Abstract of Study #2).
143William Peters, principal investigator of that trial and president of the Barbara Ann

Karmanos Cancer Institute in Detroit, has been a leading advocate of insurance coverage of
bone-marrow transplants for patients in clinical trials and a pioneer in developing the treatment.
See Nancy Ann Jeffrey & Ron Winslow, New Clash Seen Over Treatment OfBreast Canccr,

WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1999 at B1.

144See ASCO, supra note 123 (Abstract of Study #4, a study done at the University of
Witwatersrand
Medical School, Johannesburg, South Africa, by Dr. W.R. Bezwoda.).
145
5ee Michael Waldholz, DoctorAdmits FalsifyingData,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at
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Nine months later, review and further inquiry revealed that the
South African investigator had falsified his data'4S The study was
discredited, and the researcher resigned from his university admitting
that he had
"committed a serious breach of scientific honesty and
14 9
integrity.2
The disappointing results of this once highly touted procedure
have resulted in reflection and reassessment by providers and patient

advocates alike. 150

One researcher stated that there is not enough

evidence to say that high dose therapy is more effective than the

standard therapy; therefore, the researcher does not recommend its
routine use.' 5' Although some patient advocates remain firmly in favor
of this treatment, 152 others argue that it is time to recognize that

HDC/ASCR "have no benefit" in the treatment of breast153cancer and its
popularity is a "triumph of hope over experience."'

Even more

146See Philip R. Rowlings, Factors Correlated with Progression-FreeSixvival Arier
High Dose Chemotherapy and HematopoteticStem Cell Transplantationfor Metastatic Breast
Cancer,47282 JAMA 1335, 1335 (1999).
1 See id,
'4SSee Denise Grady, Breast Cancer ResearcherAdmits Falsiying Data,N.Y. Tms,
Feb. 5,2000, atA9; Michael Waldholz, DoctorAdm its FadngDataon Cancer Therapy,
WAiL ST. L, Feb. 5, 2000 at B2; Lauran Neergaard, Scientist Falsified Data Suppporting
CancerRegimen, SFATrL TmsS, Feb. 5,2000, at A2; Mary Ann Napoli, OrcologistsGuiltyof
Giving Unproven Treatment-Case of FraudInstructive for People with Cancer, HEALTH
FACes, 49
Apr. 1, 2000, availableat 2000 WNL 7525107
1 See Grady, supranote 148, at A9.
50
"Doctors and patients are rethinking the use of transplants," reported one researcher.
Another noted "[t]here has been a lot of hype about the benefits of bone marrow transplants
without any clear evidence,...[t]hese data will remind women that they have a choice PEou,
J. STAi, May 18, 1999, at A10.
5
1'
See Lorilyn Rackl, Study Raises Doubts of Bone Marrow Transplantfor Breast
Cancer Patients, CHICAGO DAILY HERA, April 19, 1999, at 3 (quoting Dr. Richard Shilkey,
Director of the Cancer Research Center, University of Chicago).
52
1 0ne patient advocacy group, the Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation stated:
[I]he results of these studies in no way suggest that this matter is
settled. The length of the follow-up in these studies is still relatively
short, and additional data analyses need to be completed. Pending
longer follow-up and subgroup analyses, the Komen Foundation vill
continue to encourage breast cancer patients considering this treatment
to consult with their oncologist to review the risks and the benefits and
to seek an unbiased second opinion when warranted.
TIRASPLANTNEws, Apr. 30, 1999.
'5See Boodman, supra note 115, at Z12 (comments of Fran Vco, President of the
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sobering is the belief by researchers that "mutual self-deception'" 4 and
"emotions and biases interfered" with timely completion of the
desperately needed studies.15 5 Certainly the recent revelations involving
the South African study have further validated that view.
FINANCING OF CLINICAL RESEARCH:
WHO DOES PAY AND WHEN?
There is a widespread concern that lack of financing chills participation
in clinical trials.1 56 However, there is little empirical evidence
supporting this belief.'5 7 A recent report issued by the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) found that this belief is based more on perception than
reality. 158 Nevertheless, the cost of clinical research has become an
increasingly contentious question in the United States. The costs can
be roughly divided into research protocol-related costs and routine
patient costs sustained by the subject during the course of the clinical
trial.
Although the federal government was once viewed as the
preeminent funding source, researchers are currently obtaining private
funding (or significant
supplementation of federal dollars) with
59
increasing frequency.1
Federal Funding: Sustaining
the Publicly Funded Research Enterprise
Traditionally, the research making the United States a leader in medical
technology and innovation was funded by federal grant money awarded

National Breast Cancer Coalition and member of the Institute of Medicine's National Cancer
Policy Board).
154See Foreman, supra note 138, at 3E (quoting medical ethicist George Annas.)
55
See Meredith Goad, Studies May Aid In Breast Cancer Fight, Data About Bone
Marrow Transplants Could Help Patients, Doctors and Hospitals Decide on Treatment,
PORTLAND PRESS HERAL, Apr. 14, 1999, at BI (quoting Dr. John K Erban, Chief of Oncology,
New England Medical Center).
15See IOM Report, supranote 11, at 53.

'57See id at 37.
58
' See id. at 2, 6,

159See David Blumenthal, Nancyanne Causino, Eric Campbell, & Karen Seashore Lewis,
RelationshipsBetween Academic Institutionsand Industry in the Life Sciences, 334 NEw ENG.
J.MED. 251, 368 (1996).
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by the NIH. 160 Indeed, we are only now emerging from what has been
described as the "golden era" of the NIH. 16 1 This golden era, which
commenced following World War II, converted the NIH from a small

group of laboratories in Bethesda, Maryland to a massive research
enterprise that stretches far beyond the Bethesda campus.'6 2

The

various national institutes fund and apportion money to research centers
all over the nation.' 63 In 1995, 35.8 billion dollars were dedicated to
164
research, comprising 3.5 percent of health expenditures.
165
percentage has risen steadily over the last forty years.

This

Funding is granted by the NIH after careful peer review of the
proposed study. 166 Peer reviewers critically evaluate the submissions in
terms of merit and flaws in research methodology. 167 If the project is
chosen for funding, the money is dispensed in accordance with the
submitted, agreed upon budget 16S This budget will include provisions

for the costs of the study, salary for the researchers, and subject
costs. 169

Such federally funded studies must comply with the federal

regulations protecting human subjects, independent of whether they
169Thisltradition is relatively short-lived. Prior to World War II,health re.earch was

financed primarily by industry, academic institutions, and private philanthropy. However, in
the aftermath of the War, the federal government poured money and rezource, into medical
research. See FuNDMIG HEALTH Scrn'zCEs REsEARCg, supranote 92, at 32-34; Harold Varmus,
BiomedicalResearch Enters the SteadyState, 333 NEW ENG. . MED. 745, 812 (1995); GAOHEHS 99-182, NIH Clinical Trials-Various Factors Affect Patient Participation., Sept. 30,
1999. 61
1 See Varmus, supranote 160, at 812.
' 62See id
'6Approximately two-thirds of federally sponsored research is conducted in academic
institutions, whereas only about a quarter is conducted in government-owned laboratories, such
as those on the Bethesda campus. This decentralization is viewed as one of the key reasons for
America's research eminence. See Funding Health Sciences Research, supranote 92, at 35-36;
see also Varmus, supranote 160, at 812.
'6See Inglehart, supra note 12, at 72.
165For example, in 1960 the federal government spent S700 million on rezearch as
compared to the $18 billion it spent in 1997. See Inglehart, supra note 12, at 73. In percentage
terms, research consumed 3.5 percent of health care expenditures in 1995, as compared to 3.2
percent in 1986. See idat 74; Neuman & Sandberg, supra note 7, at 112.
165See Funding Health Sciences Research, supra note 92, at 93.
167This competitive process typically has two sequential levels of review. First, there is a
review by a select group of scientist peers in "study sections." Second, there is review by the
advisory committees of the NIH institute. See id
1669See ia9
1 See fi at 99-100.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:441

would have had to comply by virtue of being a FDA regulated
product. 170 Research involving procedures, however, may not involve
a product governed by the FDA process.
In some cases, federally funded research will be carried out in
General Clinical Research Centers (GCRC). 17 1 These centers are
comprised of NIH-ftmded hospital beds reserved for NIH-funded
research.172 Studies involving GCRC beds use rigorous guidelines to
distinguish between routine care costs and those associated with the
research study. 173 Routine, non-research related costs are billed to the
subject patient's third-party payer and research protocol-related costs
are borne by the research grant. 174 Although the GCRC model
represents the ideal research setting, most research will not be carried
out in this manner.
A typical medical center, even an academic teaching facility, will
lack the resources to adequately differentiate between costs applicable
to research procedures versus other procedures. 17 5 In most cases, thirdparty payers will be billed for all costs and will have the burden of
reviewing claims to determine which services performed were routine
and not research protocol-related, and thus eligible for coverage.
Private Sector Financing
Despite the generous federal funding that researchers have enjoyed for
the past several decades, the trend is toward a greater percentage of
research being funded by the private sector. 176 The proportion of
research that is paid for by pharmaceutical, medical device and other
private sector industry has steadily increased. In 1986, the private
sector funded 42 percent of health care research and development. By
1995, theprivate sector's allocation of research dollars had risen to 52
percent. 17 This equated to a three-fold increase in absolute dollars, i.e.
170 ee &L
171

See Funding Health Sciences Research, supra note 92, at 99-100.

17The GCRC Program usually supports defined areas within academic medical centers.

Among the special areas of focus are AIDS and other infectious threats. See td at 107.
'rSee IOM Report, supranote 11, at 41
' 74See id at 41.
17See id at 41.
176See Neumann & Sandberg, supranote 7, at 111.

'"7See id
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from approximately $6 billion to $19 billion.17 Thus, although the
federal funding of research has incrementally increased over time, the
private funding has increased exponentially.
Private funding of research is heavily skewed to drugs, devices
and biologics, rather than to medical procedures. 179 These therapies are
researched and developed by large, often international manufacturing
firms. 8 0 Although the early phases of the research is performed within
the pharmaceutical or device firms laboratories, once the new
technology is ready for testing on human subjects, the locus of the
research is moved to a clinical setting, and
the clinical trial commences
181
centers.
medical
academic
more
in one or
Many of the private dollars financing clinical research are filtereds
to research centers by Contract Research Organizations (CROs).' 2
This is especially true in the context of the large Phase Ill multi-center
clinical trials.18
CROs contract with academic medical centers,
arrange the multi-center trial, and handle the administrative aspects of
the trial. 84 In essence, CROs move dollars from the wealthy
pharmaceutical and medical device industry to academic clinical
research centers.1 8 5 They will pay the academic research centers and
researchers for conducting the trial, cover the costs of recruiting and
caring for the subjects, and supply the drug or device that is being
researched.18 6 They will monitor the trial to be certain that the research
7
has been approved by the IRB and other necessary committees.1
'78See id at 112.

9
'7
See id
'5See id
'81lndeed, the trend is to greater outsourcing of research. Sec Andrew E. Kantra &
Andrea V. Nassan, Contract Research Organizations: Careful CRO Sekction as a Tool to

Avoid PotentialRisks, 1118 PLItCorp 301,305 (1999).

i82See id at 306. Ninety percent of companies conducting life ,ciences research bad
relationships with academic institutions in 1994. About half of the companies interacting with
academic centers support clinical trials. See Blumenthal, supra note 159, at 368.
183See Kantra & Nasson, supra note 181, at 307-0.
'84See id at 306-07.
185See Role of ContractResearch Organizationsto Increasein PharmaceuticalIud stt
MARKETER,
Mar. 29, 1999, at 1.
156

See idt
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Private financing and administration by a CRO is primarily

utilized for drug, medical device and biologics research.188 In the case
of clinical research involving procedures, the cost of care for the
subject may not be fully funded by federal grant funds.189 The patient
may require care for the underlying disorder regardless of their status as

research subject for the experimental procedure. Typically,
coverage
1
and reimbursement will be sought from third party payers.

0

PrivatePlan Coverage of ClinicalResearch:

The Disappearing "Experimental"Exclusion
Traditionally, third-party payers, be they public or private, have had
contract exclusions that deny coverage and reimbursement for
experimental and investigational procedures. 191 These exclusions apply
to reimbursement of unapproved drugs and devices, as well as provider
reimbursement for performing experimental procedures. 9 2 If the
experimental procedure is performed in a hospital and requires
additional related services, the hospitalization and193trial-related services
may also be denied coverage and reimbursement.

"Experimental"Exclusions: The Ambiguity Trap
Although health plan contracts typically exclude procedures or
therapies that are considered "experimental" or "investigational," their

'87CROs do not generally have IRBs and indeed are discouraged from being involved in
any way with the IRB for conflict of interest reasons. For example, an employee or consultant
of a CRO would be a poor choice for membership on an IRB, either commercial or university
based, given that projects managed by the CRO might be subject to that IRB's review and
approval. See Kantra & Nasson, supra note 181, at 311-12.
'88See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 23.
189For example, pharmaceutical and other private sponsors pay physicians for their work
in a clinical trial at a substantially higher rate than do government grantors. For example, for
oncology research, physicians get a median payment of $750 per patient from the National
Cancer Institute, as compared to $2500 per patient for industry sponsored trials. See IOM
Report, supranote 11, at 41-42.
'9°See id.at 30.
191See generally Angela R. Holder, Funding Innovative Medical Therapy, 57 ALB. L.
Rnv. 795 (1994) (discussing insurance companies refusal to pay some or all of the charges
relating to the care of a patient involved, however peripherally, in a clinical trial or other
study)'92See
id at 795.
' 93See id. at 802.
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194
subscriber contracts often struggle to adequately define these terms.
Health plan subscribers and beneficiaries may not even have a copy of
the contract, having been given only a summary of the health plan,
often referred to as the summary plan description. 195 When considering
a dispute involving a health plan contract or summary plan description,
in favor of the non-drafting
any ambiguity in terms will be construed
196
party, the subscriber or beneficiary.
Absent a clear definition, a term like "experimental" will likely be
197
found ambiguous and construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff.
For example, in Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan,19 3 the
plaintiff, a thirty-five year old woman with advanced breast cancer,
sought coverage for HDC/ABMT. 199 The insurer denied the claim
citing a contract provision excluding services which were
"experimental" or "research in nature." 200 The court held that both
terms were ambiguous and noted that the plaintiff's experts, who had
testified it was not experimental but an effective
prescribed the therapy,
201
therapy.
form of
In an effort to avoid ambiguity in contract clauses, many health
plans have attempted to clarify terms related to experimental and
investigational therapy exclusions.2 0 2 Results have been mixed. For
example, in one recent case, 203 the contract spelled out the specific
conditions, including breast cancer for which "[a]utologous bone
marrow transplant or other forms of stem cell rescue (in which the
patient is the donor) with high dose chemotherapy or radiation [is] not

'94See id. at 796.
'95See Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1202 (4th Cir.

1997).

196See, e.g., Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan, 517 N.1V.2d 264, E67-63

(1994) (construing ambiguities in an insurance policy drafted by an insurer in favor of the
insured); Lubeznik v. HealthChicago Inc., 644 N.EX2d 777,730 (1994) (same).
' 97See Taylor, 517 NAV.2d at 868.
"'See id

'99See id
2

0See i d
See id

201

2
02See, e.g., Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53, 55 (4th Cir. 1995)
(insurer's policy stated that "[a]utologous bone marrow transplants or other forms of stem cell
rescue (in which the patient is the donor) with high dose chemotherapy or radiation are not

covered").
2
03See id
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covered." 204 Although the exclusion with respect to the stem cell
rescue was upheld by the court, the court found that the provision
relating to the HDC portion of the procedure was ambiguous. 20 5 This
was because chemotherapy was listed as a covered service elsewhere in
the contract.22006 Thus, contrasting the two provisions, the court found
the exclusion of coverage for the 2high
dose version of chemotherapy to
07
be ambiguous and unenforceable.
Another method used by private health plans to clarify what falls
within an "experimental" or "investigationar' exclusion is reference in
the contract to the specific criteria that will be used to evaluate a given
procedure. 20 8 For example, United HealthCare, a large midwestern
health plan, chose to avoid defining "experimental" by detailed
exception language and instead opted for articulated, published criteria
for evaluating whether a treatment would be considered
"experimental. 20 9 The criteria were included in the contract and
defined experimental exclusions as:
1)

treatments not approved by the FDA to be lawfully
marketed for that use, and not identified in the American
Hospital Formulary Service, the AMA Drug Evaluation, or
the Pharmacopoeia as an appropriate use;

2)

treatment subject to review or approval by an institutional
review board;

3)

treatment that is subject of an ongoing clinical trial that
meets the definition of a Phase 1, 2, or 3 clinical trial set
forth in FDA regulations, regardless of whether it is a FDA
trial;

4)

treatment that has not been demonstrated through
prevailing, peer-reviewed medical literature to be safe and

2

°4See id at 53.

205

See id at 57.

2

°rSee id

2

°TSee Bailey, 67 F.3d
208

at 57.

See Mark Holoweiko, Experimental Treatment: Can You Do the Right Thing Without
Going2Broke?, BusINEss & HEALTH, May 1, 1995, at 38.
°gSee id.
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effective for treating or diagnosing the condition or illness
for which its use is proposed.210

Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association also uses technology
assessment criteria. 21 1 Its national technology assessment group offers

evaluations of new therapies to the member plans to aid them in
formulating coverage policy. 212 However, if the criteria are not
incorporated into 2the
beneficiary contract, they will be given short
13
shrift by the court.

Critics of such criteria-based systems argue that the physicians

chosen by the plans to review the disputed technologies are biased by
the financial incentives of denying care.214 This criticism is countered
by advocates of such criteria who note that physicians, who derive a

highly remunerative livelihood from performing these procedures, and
medical centers, which are increasingly profit-oriented, are just as
likely to be swayed by financial incentives to provide this care.?1 Most
21°See id
2t1
See
212

id
Several other large health plans also have the capacity to do technology aszeosment.
See Merian Kirchner, Who Pays For New Technology? Health Insurers are Thinking Tvice
About Coverage ofHigh Tech High PricedCare, Busnus & HEaTH, Oct. 1991, at 20. The
Blue Cross and Blue Shield evaluation considers five factors:
1)
2)

3)
4)
5)

Is the drug or device FDA approved for the medical indication in
question?
Is there sufficient information in the peer reviewed medical and scientific
literature to enable conclusions to be drawn regarding safety and
efficacy?
Does the available scientific evidence demonstrate a net beneficial effect
on health outcomes?
Is the drug, device, or treatment as safe and efficacious as existing
therapeutic alternatives?
Can the drug device or procedure reasonably be expected to satisfy
criteria 3 and 4 when applied outside the research setting.

See Pirozzi
v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 590 (E.D. Va. 1990).
213See Pirozzi,741 F. Supp. at 590.
24
1 See Holoweiko, supra note 208, at 38.
215
See id Demonstrating this phenomenon from an institutional per-sective is a national
chain of free-standing for-profit transplant centers operated by Response Oncoloy that provide
high dose chemotherapy and stem cell transplants to advanced cancer patients. See Kolata &
Eichenwald, supra note 24, at A6. See also Ann Saphir, At the Center of Cancer Care: ForProfit Outpatient CentersPlayingBigger Role in Treatment, ClinicalTrials,MODeMN
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recently, there has been a movement on the part of payers and
legislatures to develop external independent reviewer groups to review
and adjudicate
coverage disputes involving new technologies and
2 16
treatments.

Disputes regarding coverage gain a higher level of complexity in
the context of self-insured Employee Welfare Benefit Health Plans,
which, unlike traditional health
insurers and plans, are governed by
217
federal, rather than state law.
Self-funded Health Plans
and the Shifting Standardof Review
Self-funded health plans provide health care coverage for an increasing
percentage of Americans. 218 In these plans, the employer self-insures,
219

assuming the risk of loss for the health care claims of its employees.

These plans are governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security
22

Act (ERISA) of

1974220

and are susceptible to federal, not state law.

1

Indeed, ERISA preempts state laws, including state common law

actions, that relate to such self-funded health plans.222 For example, in
HEALTHCAR_, May 31, 1999 at 28 ("From 1996 to 1993, outpatient cancer centers doubled to
806").216See Holoweiko,
supra note 208, at 38.
27
" See 29 U.S.C. § 11332 (1994) (ERISA regulates self-insured Employee Welfare
Benefit218
Plans).
Between 107 and 120 million Americans with an employer provided health plan are
covered under an ERISA plan; this is approximately 60 percent of those with employerprovided coverage. See HIAA, SouRcE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 1997-1998, 33
(1998). The percentage of employers who choose to self-insure is steadily increasing. See id
Employers choosing to self-insure may do so under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA). See id ERISA provides employers with a series of advantages that result in
administrative efficiencies, cost savings, and increased benefit design flexibility. See id,
ERISA plans may contract with an insurer, third party administrator, or most commonly,
managed care plan to administer the benefits and process claims, while the employer retains the
risk of losses. See id Such self-funded plans bear the risk of increased health costs directly.
See id. The intermediary merely provides an "administrative services only" (ASO) product to
the employer.
See id.
2
19See

id.

"°See 29 U.S.C. § 11332 (1994).
"1 See id.
2nA state law may be held to "relate to" ERISA plans if it affects an ERISA plan in any
foreseeable way. So long as the state law has any "connection with" or "reference to" such
plans, it will be preempted. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S 724, 739
(1985). Accord Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1983). Congress has
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a recent Ninth Circuit case, Bast v. PrudentialInsurance Company, 3
the court held that a widower's suit alleging a bad faith refusal to cover
his deceased wife's HDC/ASCR was preempted by ERISA." 4 Despite
being cognizant of the tragic facts, the court concluded that the plaintiff
could seek no remedy under state law causes of action and was,
5
therefore, left without a remedym2
Under ERISA, significant deference is afforded the health plan
with respect to interpretation of the plan and its scope. 26 However, in
order to be granted such deference, the benefit plan must delegate
discretionary authority to the plan administrator to construe the terms
of the plan and determine benefit eligibility. 2 7 Generally, when a
benefit decision is disputed, the court will engage in de novo review,
ultimately construing any ambiguity in coverage terms in favor of the
insured.*22 Under ERISA, de novo review serves as a default standard
and is employed only when the plan has failed to definitively allocate
to the plan administrator the authority to interpret the terms of the
229
plan.
Provided that the plan has explicitly provided the administrator
with discretionary authority, the standard of review will be
considerably more deferential to the plan than the default de novo
standard. 30 Generally, fiduciaries are deemed to have abused their

rejected "more limited" preemption language that would have been "applicable only to state
laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA." Moreover, a state law may "relate
to" a benefit plan "even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans or the effect

is only indirect." Ingersoll-Rand Corp. v. McLendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-39 (1990). ERISA
would not preempt a "generally applicable statute that makes no reference to, or... functions
irrespective ot the existence of an ERISA plan." Sec idL at 139. In Pataki v. Travclrs
Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 664 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a surcharge placed upon
hospital bills submitted to all payors except Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Medicaid, and HMO

had an insufficient nexus to the self-insured plans and was not preempted by ERISA.
"3 See Bast v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003 (1998).
'2 4See idat 1008.
2Under ERISA, the only remedy due to a plaintiff improperly denied benefits is
equitable relief. There is no remedy under ERISA that provides for money damages. Sce id at
1009.
226See Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co., 951 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1995).
227See Glausner-Nagy v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 987 F. Supp. 1002, 1011 (N.D. Ohio
1997).
"2See Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Srvcs, 3 F.3d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1993).
"2See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruech, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
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discretion "if they render decisions without any explanation, or

construe provisions of the plan in a way that clearly conflicts with the
plain language of the plan." 231 The court's role under this standard is
limited to determining whether the administrator's "interpretation was
' 2

made rationally and in good faith-not whether it was right. i
Factors considered in determining "rationality" include the
reasonableness or fairness of the decision-making, internal consistency
of interpretations made by theplan administrator, and the factual
background of the determination. 233
Some courts have held that "less deference should be afforded to

the decision of a plan administrator who is also a senior management
official of the employer than is given to decision of an independent

administrator" because of the "conflict of interest" inherent in the
former's position. 234 This view has given rise to a growing movement
toward using a "sliding scale" in assessing how much
deference should
2 5

be given an administrator in a dispute over benefits. 3

Despite the barriers presented by ERISA, in recent years, use of
the default de novo standard or other less deferential standard has been
the rule rather than the exception in cases brought by plaintiffs seeking
coverage for experimental procedures. 23 6 As a result, even in the
context of ERISA plans, plaintiffs have been successful in obtaining

coverage for HDC/ASCR.

2
23
See Johnson v. Trustee West Conf. Teamster Pens. Trust Fund, 879 F.2d 651, 654 (9th
Cir. 1989).
3'See id
22
3 See Anderson v. CIBA-Geigy Corp., 759 F.2d 1518, 1522 (1Ith Cir. 1985).
33See id
2 4See Kunin v. Benefit Life, 696 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (C.D. Cal 1988). See also Judith
C. Bostrom, The Conflict of Interest Standardin ERISA Cases: Can it be Avoided In the Denial
of High Dose Chemotherapy Treatmentfor Breast Cancer? 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1,
14-18 (1999).
235See Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 824 (10th Cir. 1996).
'36See e.g. Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 764 F. Supp. 728, 729 (D.C. Conn 1991)
(applying de novo review); Kulakowski v. Rochester Hospital Service Corp., 779 F. Supp. 710,
716 (W.D. N.Y. 1991) (same); Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 67 F. 3d 53, 56 (4th Cir.
1996) (same).
'37See, e.g., Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 764 F. Supp. 728, 732 (D.C. Conn 1991)
(applying de novo review); Kulakowski v. Rochester Hosp. Srvc. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 710, 716
(W.D. N.Y. 1991) (same); Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 67 F. 3d 53, 56 (4th Cir. 1996)

(same).
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Litigation costs have prompted many employers and health
insurers to abandon attempts to deny coverage for HDC/ASCR. 3s For
example, despite the uncertainty surrounding the procedure, the Office
of Personnel Management ordered the 350 health plans that cover
federal employees to cover the procedure.2 9 In 1996, a government
study revealed that twelve out of twelve insurers contacted admitted
that they were covering HDC/ASCR for breast cancer despite their
belief that it was of unproven value. 240 They had tacitly decided to
cover this2therapy
to avoid litigation, unfavorable press and legislative
41
mandates.

Health plans have found that the cost of denying coverage for
controversial experimental therapies has a high public relations price
tag242 Increasingly, the war over coverage of experimental
therapies is
243
waged not in the courts, but in the media.
Patients seeking
experimental or novel therapies have found the media a more
expeditious route of access to experimental therapy. As a result of high
profile media attention and zealous advocacy by breast cancer support
groups, coverage for HDC/ABMT or
HDC/ASCR 24 for breast cancer
245
has been mandated in several states.
There is a distinct downside to the voluntary or mandated
capitulation by health plans. In the case of the HDC/ASCR, there is
38 See GAO/HEHS 96-83, supra note 2.

2"See aL
24'See id
24

'See id

2
id
244See
3

In the case of high dose chemotherapy and transplant, the media blitz has b.-en aided
by fears and hype about the dangers of managed care. See, e.g., Michael Parridh, It Could
Happen to You, HEALTH, May 15, 1996, at 20; Do Managed Care Contracty Place You at
Risk? RN, Apr. 1, 1999, at 24; Michael Hiltzik, Draving the Line: an HMO Dilemma, LA
TI~MEs, Jan. 15, 1996, at 1; Tim O'Leary, HealthNet Told to Pay $I Million, RnIEREDE PRsSENTERPRISE, Oct. 18, 1995, at BO.
244 Depending on when the provision was enacted, it may refer to the older HDCABMT

procedure. the more recent HDC/ASCR procedure, or both

245
Among these states are Kentucky (KY. REv. STAT. Ami. § 304, 3S-1936 (BanksBaldwin 1994)), Michigan (_iacH. COMP. LAWS ANi. § 24 660 (416) (West 1993)), Minncota

(MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A-309 (West 1996)), Missouri (Mo. Amt. STAT. § 376.1200 (Wet

1991 & Supp. 2000)), Montana (MowT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-1521 (1993)), New Harnpzhire
(N.L REV. STAT. ANN. 415: 18-C (1998)), New Jersey, NJ. STAT. Arw. § 17:45-6k (We.t
1996)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-7-2504 (1994 & Supp. 1999)), and Virginia (VA.

CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:l(Michie 1999)).
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substantial concern that participation in trials and accrual of safety and
efficacy information was actually hindered by payment extracted from
third party private payers. 24 6 Indeed, reimbursement encourages the
use of unproven technologies, and thus compounds the potential harms
resulting from their premature use.247 Recent concerns have focused on
the reluctance of private health plans to deny care. 248 Health policy
scholar Alain Enthoven argues that there "isan urgent need for
managed care to second-guess decisions by physicians to subject
patient to needlessly risky surgery and needlessly costly tests. 249
MedicareReimbursement of
ServicesAssociatedwith ClinicalTrials
At the time Medicare was enacted in 1965, one of the standards that
was borrowed from the private health insurance market was the
requirement that care must be medically necessary and reasonable in
order to be covered and reimbursed by Medicare. 250 Therapies and
technologies that are "investigational" or "experimental" are not
eligible for coverage.2 5 1 Although this coverage policy is frequently
articulated by Medicare, there is considerable uncertainty as to how
concretely this exclusion is administered and maintained.
In some cases, Medicare and the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) will study a new therapy or procedure and

246

0ne National Cancer Institute official stated that the recent breast cancer studies have
shown that only good clinical trials can establish that a treatment works and that without
adequate trials, patients and doctors "can be misled and progress against cancer can be
hindered." Marilynn Marchione, Advocacy Gets Ahead of Science in Battle Against Breast
Cancer,
247MiLWAUKEE JOURNAL SEmmL Apr. 19, 1999, at I.
Performance of such experimental procedures outside of the clinical trial setting
leaves patients unprotected by the stringent study review, informed consent requirements, and

other human subjects protections applicable to legitimate clinical trials. See John H. Ferguson,
Court Ordered Reimbursement for Unproven Medical Technology, 269 JAMA 2116, 2116
(1993 248see Michael M Weinstein, In Denial:
Managed Care's Other Problem-Its Not What
You Think, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb 28, 1999, at 10.
249
See id.

2s°See 42
251

U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (1994).
This provision was explicitly spelled out in 1977 with Part A Intermediary Letter, No.

77-4, Jan. 1977.
2s2See Medicare Technology Assessment and Medical Coverage Decisions, GAO/HEHS
94-195FS (July 20, 1994).
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issue a binding coverage decision.253 For example, HDC/ASCR is not
covered for treatment of solid tumors, such as breast cancer, under one
such national coverage decision. 254 This decision was tested in the case
of Bosko v. Shalala,25 5 in which a plaintiff argued that the decision,
issued in 1989, was no longer consistent with current technology and
medical opinion.2 56 However, the court noted that "legislators and
judges are not medical specialists, and for that reason, it is necessary
that administrative agencies develop and apply medical expertise.,757
The court refused to accept the plaintiff's contention that Medicare's
3
decision to deny coverage was not based on "substantial evidence."2
The vast majority of Medicare coverage decisions are not the
result of standard federal policy, but rather are interpretations made by
fiscal intermediaries and carriers. 259 Moreover, HCFA has refrained
from issuing explicit guidelines regarding what is reimbursable and
what is not when the beneficiary is a subject in a clinical trial.P
Clinical research may result in a broad array of patient care
services, most of which would be routinely covered by Medicare.26
For example, a hospitalization for treatment of cancer would likely
involve many services, in addition to the services or therapy that is
provided under the research protocol. Inpatient care is generally paid
under Part A of the Medicare Plan, using the diagnosis related group
method of reimbursement.262 In the normal course of billing, the
charge for the hospitalization would be based on the discharge
diagnosis, not a tallying and individualized review of each of the
services provided.263 The services provided by the physicians and other
23

See id Note, however, that the Office for Technology As-escient has baen
discontinued and as a result, national coverage decision-making capacity is imperiled.
2"Medicare covers autologous stem cell transplant for several malignant conditions,
including leukemia. However, the policy specifically excludes coverage for solid tumors (such
as breast cancer) with the exception of neuroblastoma. See Coverage Issues Manual-Medical
s

Procedures 35-30, <httpv/www.hcfa.gov>.

255See Bosko v. Shalala, 995 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1996).
'6See id at 583.
2'7See id
2

"See id

29See id
2See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 30.

2'1See id at 54.
02See id
2See id at 30.
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individual Part B providers are billed to Medicare on the resourcebased relative value scale. 264 This is a fee-for-service system, so a
service that would be normally covered, like a doctor visit, procedure
or a lab test, would be reimbursed as usual unless the provider were to
proactively exclude it as specifically related to clinical research.265
Indeed, regardless of what HCFA's initial intent might have been
with respect to coverage of services connected with clinical research, it
has found itself unable to discern when routine services, otherwise
covered, are delivered to patients because of their participation in
clinical trials.2 66 According to a recent study published by the IOM,
coverage and reimbursement of medical services-especially routine
services-associated with clinical trials is common. 267 Indeed, the
IOM sought to verify this "widespread understanding" with a study
268
commissioned by the Lewin Group, a health policy consulting firm.
In the course of the study, clinical trial investigators reported that
routine patient claims generated in clinical trials are routinely submitted
and paid by plans.26 9 This finding was sustained across a variety of
research areas. For example, surveyed oncologists alleged that they bill
third-party payers for both investigational and routine patient care
services.270 In many cases, a lack of clarity about what is the standard
therapy contributes to the inability to draw a clear distinction between
the two categories.2 7 ' In fact, oncologists indicated that claims would
be routinely submitted for nearly all the routine services used in the
course of the clinical trial.272 Similarly, cardiologists reported that they
trials,
commonly bill insurers for routine patient costs in clinical
273
costs.
procedure
protocol-specific
for
although not necessarily
In 1996, an audit revealed that most of the audited hospitals had
billed Medicare for care rendered in connection with implantable

2See id. at 34.
265

2

See IOM Report, supranote 11, at 30.

6See id. at 30.

26See id at 30-31.

8
26'
See id at 38-40.
269

See id at 39-43.
IOM Report, supra note 11, at 39-40.
'See id at 42.

27 0
See
27

2

72See id at 39-40.
273See id at 40-41.

2000]

FINANCING CLINICAL RESEARCH

medical devices. 274 Ultimately, HCFA chose to enter into an
agreement with the FDA and cover a large percentage of
investigational devices.2 75 Indeed, investigational devices that fall into
this covered category
include 96 percent of the devices in ongoing
27 6

clinical trials

HCFA has also engaged in a number of "coverage with
conditions" arrangements designed to provide access to certain
promising, still investigational, treatments being offered in "centers of
excellence." 277 This was the method HCFA chose to employ when
confronted with lung volume reduction surgery (LVRC).?" Like the
HDC/ASCR treatment for breast cancer, LVRC was hailed as a
breakthrough treatment for patients with advanced emphysema. 279
Patients who had few other options embraced the surgery eagerly,
despite the lack of research demonstrating its safety and efficacy.2 0
Many, if not most, of these patients submitted claims to Medicare for
coverage of the procedure. 2 81 Medicare made the decision to only
cover the costs of this controversial therapy when it was administered
in the context of an authorized clinical trial.?
In addition to the clinical trial costs that Medicare has chosen to
assume, a 1997 Government Accounting Office report found that
Medicare was reimbursing, albeit mistakenly, routine patient care costs
sustained by patients in cancer clinical trial programs.2 8 3 This report
was further
verified by information obtained by the IOM for its 1999
4
28

study.

IOM researchers contacted Medical Directors of fiscal
intermediaries and questioned them as to their reimbursement practices.
The Medical Directors revealed "general recognition" that providers

274

See id at 32.

5
"7
See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 33.
276

See id at 34.

277

See id at 36.
278See Coverage Issues Manual-Medical Procedures 35-93, <http:Jww/ihCfagov>;
Tonelli, supra note 7, at 35.
2
79See Tonelli, supranote 7, at 35.
2,,See id
28'See id

'8See IOM Report, supranote 11, at 36; Tonelli, supra note 7, at 35.
mSee IOM Report, supra note 11, at 33.
28See id at 39.
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regularly submit claims for services provided in clinical trials and
further noted that detecting such claims would be dependent on some
inconsistency signaling participation in a clinical trial 85 Interestingly,
regardless of the established Medicare policy denying such claims, if
they are detected, "no medical directors said they could
flatly deny
286
trials."
clinical
in
patients
all
and
any
for
reimbursement
In summary, under both Medicare and private health plans, many
of the routine costs associated with clinical trials are covered and
reimbursed.287 In many cases, reimbursement may be unwitting, due to
an inability to differentiate between claims associated with clinical
trials and those associated with other routine patient care. 288 In other
cases, the private health plan or Medicare fiscal intermediary
knowingly pays these costs, reasoning that many of the costs would
have been incurred in caring for the patient regardless of the clinical
trial.289 In yet other cases, the plan seeks to avoid costly courtroom
and/or media battles by succumbing to pressure to pay for an unproven
therapy or procedure.2 9°
None of these solutions, however appealing to researchers and
patients seeking experimental procedures, address the question whether
unproven therapies merit coverage in our increasingly costly health
care system.
Who Should Pay and Why?
Balancing Risks, Benefits and Costs
Current policy with respect to coverage and reimbursement of clinical
trials does not contain explicit guidelines, even in the case of Medicare
the largest single payer.2 91 Explicit guidelines are desperately needed,
not only by Medicare, but other payers, researchers and patients. The
IOM recently issued a series of recommendations for an explicit
Medicare coverage policy for clinical trials. 292
The IOM
28

sSee id. at 43-44.
2"76See idat 43.
28
See id.
288

See IOM Report, supranote 11, at 43.

289

See id. at 6.

29 0

See GAO/HEHS 96-83, supra note 2.
2 91
See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 30-32.

292See id
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recommendations argue for coverage of routine patient costs incurred
in the course of clinical research, placing virtually the entire burden for
these costs on third party payer.293 This article proposes a slightly
different strategy which would allocate costs of research to those who
are most likely to benefit now and in the future.
The standard applied to funding of clinical research should seek to
reflect the risks and benefits borne by those with a vested interest in
study outcomes. Foremost among these are human subjects. Third
party payers, be they public payers like Medicare., or private health
plans, have less of a personal stake in research. Yet third party payers
maintain a major role in covering the costs of health care, and,
therefore, have a vested interest in improved health outcomes. Finally,
those who fund research and researchers themselves are direct
stakeholders in the research enterprise.
The DirectStakeholders:
Funders,Researchersand Providers
Research is largely funded by the federal government and private
industry. 294 Federal funding is drawn from tax dollars. Private
industry support of research is ultimately recovered by the
pharmaceutical, device or other manufacturer through sales of the
approved product to consumers. 295 Both private and public funders
have a duty to finance research that will maximize individual and
public health benefit while limiting risk.2 969 7 This duty is woven into
2
virtually every step of the research process.
Federal funding agencies, such as the NIH, have dual concerns
that the medical and scientific research they fund contributes to the
health and safety of the public and also advances the frontier of science.
To ensure this, they carefully review research projects, award dollars

29'See id at 53-64.

2

-4See Neumann & Sandberg, supra note 7, at I 11.
295 Pharmaceutical industry research and development spending as a percentage of U.S.

pharmaceutical sales has risen from 11-12 percent in the 1970s to 21 percent in 1997. Sae
Neumann & Sandberg, supra note 7, at I 11. Typically private sector sponsors of clinical trials

cover the costs of protocol-induced services, but do not provide money for routine patient co-ts.
See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 7.
296See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 30-33.
297
see id. at30.
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only to those judged worthy, and require adherence to human subject
protections. 29 8 Private industry funders are usually pharmaceutical
firms who, although they are economically motivated, are nonetheless
bound by federal law to conduct research
in a principled fashion that
299
maximizes the safety of human subjects.
Protection of human subjects and the duty to provide full
disclosure is crucial to research funded by the federal government or
private industry.30 0 In the case of FDA regulated and federally funded
research, protection of human subjects is fostered,
but not absolutely
30 1
ensured, by human subject protections and IRBs.
Even when IRB approval has been obtained, human subject
protections have proven inadequate on occasion. 30 2 For example, gene
therapy research being conducted at the University of Pennsylvania
recently resulted in the death of a young subject. 30 3 The subject, who
had a genetic enzyme disorder that required dietary restrictions, was
304
enrolled in a clinical trial that involved injecting a viral vector
carrying the missing gene directly into the liver.30 5 Investigation of the
subject's death revealed that the subject had not been an appropriate
candidate for the study, and that the subject had been misled as to a
likelihood of benefit, and that information regarding severe adverse
reactions had been withheld.30 6 This violation of research ethics and
breach of standards resulted in the suspension of the University of
Pennsylvania's gene therapy program. 30 7 Even more alarming than the

293

See Funding Health Services Research, supra note 92, at 93-96; SUOAIMAN, supra
note 93,2 9at 33-34.
1 see 21 C.F.R § 50 (1999) (codifying the "Common Rule" as applicable to research for
products seeking FDA approval.)
3

°Osee 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1999).

301

See id Although the IRB is able to evaluate the study before it is undertaken and

reevaluates
it periodically, it does not directly monitor the study.
3
°2See Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Gene Therapy's Troubling Crossroads:A Death
Raises30Questions
ofEthics, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1999, at A3.
3
See id.
34See Stolberg, supra note 3, at Al.
305

See id. The goal was for the gene to begin to synthesize the necessary enzyme once it

had been
imported into the subject's liver. See id
305See id.; Teen's Father: Gene Therapy's Risks Hidden, CHICAGO SuN-TIE s, Feb. 3,
2000, at 23.
307
See Jeffrey Brainard & D.W. Miller, U.S. Regulators Suspend Medical Studies at 2
Universities,CHRON. HIH ER EDUC., Feb. 4,2000 at A30; Stolberg, supra note 3, at Al.
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human subject lapses in this single case was the revelation that adverse
reactions to experimental gene therapy, including deaths, had not bean
reported as required by law by researchers at Harvard .3 Reseachers,
it is alleged, have been overzealous and cavalier, disregarding their
duty to abide by the research protocol and comply with human subject

protections. 30 9 The aftermath of the gene therapy debacle has
reawakened Congressional interest in enhancing the protections
accorded to human subjects.310 But while federal regulations afford

human subjects some protection in the United States, 31' research is an
international enterprise; studies from other nations impact research and
care in the United States.312 For example, in the ease of the
HDC/ASCR research, much hope was vested in the South African
study that had allegedly shown benefit 313 This hope was quickly

dashed, when it was revealed that, not only had the data been falsified,
but the investigator
had successfully duped the IRB in a South African
14
3

University.
30

8See Deborah Nelson & Rick Weiss, Gene-Therapy D.eaths Belatedly Rcprtd,
SEATrLTuMs, Jan. 31,2000, atAl, All.
'09See d Moreover, this gene therapy research is doubly bound to comply with hurna
subjects protection; the research involves a biotechnology product, regulated under the FDA,
and was
3 0partially federally funded. See id
M See Lisa Seachrist, Senate Questions Orersight of Gene Therapy E.:rn!,
BiowoRiD Today, Feb. 3, 2000, at 30; Chris Adams, Regulators Plan to Shrp n Watch Oror
Gene Therapy,
WALL. ST. J., Feb. 3,2000, at B23.
3
UThere has been much attention focused upon human rights iszue3 in the contc,:t of
experimentation. This has largely been a result of the atrocities of the Holocauzt in World War
I and other war-related research. See Kevin M. King, A Proposal fo'tr
El?
ffetive
InternationalRegulation of BiomedicalResearch Involving Human Subjccts, 34 STA. J. W-I1
L 163, 167 (1998). However, much of this attention has focused on the theoretical, rafler than
the practical
application of the well-recognized principles.
312
For example, the HDC/ASCR breast cancer clinical trial included a total of five
studies, only two of which were conducted in the United States. See ASCO, s~rpa no.e 123.
The study with falsified data was done in a South African University, v.hich had Ln IRB in
place. Nevertheless, they did not notice that the researcher had submitted falsificd data until
questions began to be asked. See Grady, supra note 148. .Ioreover, there are atlo quetions a.
to how this bogus study was able to pass muster vith the American Society of Clinical
Oncology. When questioned as to their standards, a society official stated that the "group hzs
rigorous
31 scientific standards, but essentially used an honor system." Ie
3See ASCO, supra note 123 (abstract of Study f4). See Grady, supra note 140, at A7;
Lauran Neergaard, Studies on Breast Cancer Treatment Breed Debate-OfFi4, Or. Fir.*
Marrow Transplant Helps Women Live Longer, Other's Disagre," AA
LrOV'1 r.~aTG
CALi, 31
Apr. 16, 1999, at All.

4See Grady,supra note 148, at A7.
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Additionally, researchers are increasingly susceptible to conflicts
of interest.315 As research is increasingly funded by private industry, it
is becoming more dominated by profit motives as opposed to
traditional academic values.3 16 For example, the field of gene therapy
has moved from a focus upon rare genetic diseases to cancer
treatment. 317 Since cancer affects a greater portion of the population
than rare genetic disorders, the development of cancer treatments
inevitably results in the making of tremendous profits, far greater than
profits resulting from treatment of a rare genetic disorder. 31 8 For
example, Response Oncology, a for-profit chain providing HDC/ASCR
brought in an impressive $128 million in revenues in 1998 alone,
boasting a 15 percent profit margin. 319 Academic medical centers also
have come to view
their HDC/ASCR programs as the "cash cow for the
320
cancer service."
Scientists, who once shared results and sought collaborative
consult, now must be mindful of the propriety interests of the funder of
the research.32' Moreover, scientists may share in that proprietary
interest if they or their academic institution ultimately will share in the
financial success of the final product. 322 In the University of
Pennsylvania gene therapy program, the University was allied with
several biotechnology companies that were involved in similar
research.323 One of the companies had been founded by a leading
geneticist involved in the study that resulted in the subject's death.324
3 5

Critics express concern that gene therapy research is vulnerable to abuse because it is

largely backed by venture capital. Researchers often are also investors. In their latter role, they
may be tempted to oversell the promise of the experiments and keep knowledge of adverse
events quiet so as not to depress stock price. See Gene Therapy Run Amok; WASH. POST, Jan.
29, 2000; Ellen Goodman, Gene Therapy Need Government Reins, NEWSDAY, Feb. 5, 2000, at
B7. 316
See Weiss & Nelson, supra note 301, at A3.
3 17
See id.

318
See
319

id; Saphir, supra note 215, at 28.

See Kolata & Eichenwald, supra note 24, at Al. For example, in the aftermath of the

breast cancer studies presented at ASCO, Response Oncology experienced a 23 percent
decrease in revenue. See David Flaum, Drop in High Dose Chemotherapy Cuts Response
Oncology's
Profits, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Aug. 13, 1999, at C2.
32
°See Kolata & Eichenwald, supra note 24, at Al.
32t
See Weiss & Nelson, supra note 301, at A3.
322See id.
32
3See Stolberg, supra note 3, at Al.
324
See Weiss & Nelson, supra note 301, at Al; Stolberg, supra note 3, at Al.
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Although the University and its researchers denied that their financial
interests influenced their ardor for conducting the research or played a
role in their skirting the human subjects protections, questions about
researchers' motives have persisted.
Researchers may also be corrupted by the quest for academic
3 26
prestige and the all-important currency of academic publications.
For example, in the recent revelations regarding the falsified study on
breast cancer, the researcher stated that he had engaged in the fraud
"out of a foolish desire to make the presentation more acceptable to an
audience." 327 Apparently he was seeking the affirmation and respect of
peers when he boldly presented the falsified study at the American
Society of Clinical Oncologists and basked 3 in
the glory of having
23
produced the "ray of hope" for cancer patients.
The situation becomes even more complex when the "researcher"
is also a provider of the unproven therapy.3 2 This is frequently the case
when a therapy's "hype outpaces its hope."330 The danger is
exponentially increased when the therapy is a procedure not subject to
federal regulations and not monitored by an IRB. In these instances,
providers have demonstrated they are unlikely to critically review the
innovative procedures that they recommend.33 '
3

2One of those questioning the motives of the University of Pennsylvania re-archer
was the father of the subject who succumbed. In his testimony before Congra., the subjects
father stated that both he and his son were misled by reearcher-%%vhosemotivations were, in

retrospect, suspect. Citing "money and fame" as goals in the "race for results," the father urged
Congress to fortify the human subjects protections. See Weiss & Nelson, supra note 301, at

A3.

' 2 6See Goodman, supra note 314, at B7 ("Irihe prize may be Nobel as

vell as

financial").

' 27See Lauran Neergaard, Scientist FalsifiedDataSupporting Cancer Regimen, SFATME

TI Es,3Feb.5,
2000 at A2.
78See Grady, supra note 148, at A7.
32'The reimbursement system rewards physicians for providing as many services as
possible
to their patients. See Jost, supra note 4, at 659.
330
See Goodman, supra note 314, at B7.
33

For example, in the case of lung volume reduction surgery, another unproven
procedure with no evidence-based research supporting its use, numerous institutions and
physician eagerly began to offer the procedure. Indeed, several centers began to recruit
referrals using mass mailings. See Tonelli, supra note 7, at 35. Similarly in the case of the

HDC/ASCR treatment for breast cancer, oncologists promoted the unproven treatment with
complete impunity. Indeed even the American Society of Clinical Oncology was emphatically
touting the therapy as superior as early as 1992. See Napoli, supra note 148.
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Such is the case with HDC/ASCR. Seeking to supply a public
demand, providers have administered this unproven therapy to
thousands of patients outside of clinical trials. 332 They have billed third
party payers for this therapy and refused treatment to patients unless
they could guarantee payment.333 Moreover, seeing an opportunity to
exploit the patients and the payers, providers have launched highly
lucrative for-profit ventures334offering this unproven, risky therapy to
these vulnerable consumers.
In summary, fumders of research have a vested interest in
producing products and therapies that will maximize benefit and limit
risks to the ultimate consumers. The federal government is motivated
by its desire to better public health and safety. Private industry is
motivated by the profit that will result from a safe, effective,
marketable new treatment. Researchers' aims are more complicated.
Some function as pure academicians while others seek to be
entrepreneurs. This introduces numerous potential conflicts of interest.
Researchers, then, may have a financial stake in the new product 335
or
device, either directly or through the research center or university.
Similarly the researcher may be swayed by a desire to impress his
peers, build his academic reputation and win tenure and other
accolades. 336 Those who provide unproven therapies, even in the
context of "last best hope," do so for money or prestige, often without
the approval of an IRB, and little, if any, accountability.
Empathy for
337
motive.
secondary
a
but
be
the patient may

33

2See Neergaard, supranote 312, at A 11.

333

For example, patients requesting the therapy are typically asked to put their money on

the table before they can qualify. For example, one press story recounted the saga of a young

woman with breast cancer who received not one, but two HDC/ASCR procedures during her
long battle with breast cancer. For the first one, she was required to pay $80,000, a very

discounted rate because her husband was a physician on the hospital's staff. The second
procedure, which required a six week hospitalization cost $280,000. Despite the fact that the
care was not provided through a controlled study, the patient's health plan covered the cost.
See Foreman,
supra note 110, at B1.
334
See discussion on Response Oncology centers, infra at p. 475.
335
See Kolata & Eichenwald, supra note 24, at Al.
336
See
337

notes 318 & 319, infra, and accompanying text.
See id.
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The Unsteady Balance Between
PatientProtection andAutononmy
Although patient autonomy is one of our most cherished ethical
principles, it must be balanced with the need for carefully monitored
protections in the context of clinical research. 38 Patients are often
imbued with both an expectation of health care as a right and a belief
that research always provides benefit to the subject. Neither of these
assumptions reflect reality.
Federal regulations limit subject/patient access to drugs, devices
and therapies until they are proven safe and effective. a39 This
protection extends not only to the individual subjects but to society as a
whole in that distribution of research products and therapies is limited
until ihey are of proven quality and safety.34° Violation of these laws
and regulations will result in government censure with civil penalties
and even criminal prosecution.
In the case of FDA regulated products and research conducted
under the NIH, the law strikes a balance between protecting subject
patients and furthering research. Patients may seek to be subjects, and
may even be paid to enroll in the study, but mechanisms are in place to
protect them from exploitation and victimization by researchers.342
This is not paternalism. It is recognition that patient/subjects in
research are inherently disadvantaged as parties in highly technical and
complex research projects.
Patient autonomy also is modulated in the context of how limited
resources are distributed. For example, with regard to Medicare and
33

There is, for example, an entirely different ethic and flavor to informed consent in the
context of research. In research, informed consent essentially focuses on emphasizing the
unknowns of the experiment and on the fact that the subject cannot necessarily expect benefit.
In traditional informed consent transactions, the goal is to disclose all of the known, material
information to the patient, to aid them in making the most beneficial choice they can. See
Tonelli,339supranote 7, at 35.
See Zujewski, supra note 120, at 200.

34See id.
3'See id
2
3 See Neal Dickert & Christine Grady, What's the Price of a Research Subjcct?
Approaches to Paymentfor Research Participation,341 NEw ENG. . MED. 137, 193 (1999).

These mechanisms include informed consent, protocol review and evaluation by the grantor
and the IRB, and full disclosure of risks and benefits, including the fact that the research may

not benefit the subject directly. These protection are designed to enhance autonomy as well as
protect
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Medicaid, regulations may limit what the autonomous patient may
receive and when.343 In private health plans, the employer or the

insurance contract will limit the scope of coverage and the amount of
reimbursement. 344 With both public and private payers,
limitations on
345

resources may limit patient access to certain services.

What, then, happens when a patient demands access to an

unproven experimental therapy? This situation has emerged in the
context of cancer therapies like laetrile 346 and more recently with
HDC/ASCR.347 The patient often sees the experimental therapy as a
last best chance.348 Indeed, this view is often echoed by the provider
offering the therapy.349 Having employed all other available therapies
without success, the patient is desperate for another alternative.3 5 0 But
satisfying a demand for this unproven treatment is fraught with
unfavorable consequences, both for the individual patient and society at
large.
The dying patient is in a vulnerable position and may be unable to
objectively analyze the merits and appreciate the perils of the
experimental therapy.35 ' Moreover, this patient is easy prey for the
34 3

See id.
344See id
34 5
See id.
346
See Wilson v. Traveler Ins. Co., 605 P.2d 1327 (Okla. 1980) (awarding lung cancer
patient treatment in a coverage dispute over laetrile due to the ambiguousness of the contract
exclusion clause). Laetrile was subject to much of the same zealotry as HDC/ASCR. No less
than 21 states mandated coverage before it was finally discredited as a therapy for cancer. See
Ferguson,
supra note 246, at 2117 (discussing the laetrile controversy).
347
See discussion infra at p. 481. Moreover, this is not unique to the United States. In
Italy, a combination of hormones, vitamins and low dose chemotherapy for cancer treatment
generates such public demand that 36 percent of Italian prime time news was devoted to
discussions of the therapy. The therapy was understood to be ineffective and harmful. See
Study
Reports
DiBella
Multitherapy
as
Ineffective,
CANCER
TRIALS,
<http://cancertrials.nci.nih.gov.>
348
See Marilynn Marchione, Advocacy Gets Ahead of Science in Battle Against Breast
Cancer-WomenDemand Stem Cell TransplantsBefore ClinicalTrials Can Test Their Worth,
MLWAUKLE
J. SENTinEL, Apr. 18, 1999, atA3.
349
See Kolata & Eichenwald, supra note 24, at A6.
35
°See id
35 1
Indeed, some argue that terminally and/or desperately ill patients should be treated as
a vulnerable class and accorded enhanced protections in the context of research. See generally
D. Christian Addicott, Regulating Research on the Terminally I11: A Proposalfor Heightened
Safeguards, 15 J. CoNTEw. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 479 (1999) (discussing treating terminally ill
patients as a vulnerable class).
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unprincipled, unscrupulous researcher 352 or the ignorant, eager-toplease, eager-to-make-a-profit provider. 353 In either case, allowing
patients4 unfettered autonomy exposes them to a number of unnecessary
35

risks.

In the gene therapy experiments, there have been several deaths in
addition to the young man in Pennsylvania. 355 Similarly, in the
falsified HDC/ASCR breast cancer trial, the control group was given a
lesser regimen of chemotherapy to produce the impression that
HDC/ASCR was superior. 356 While the research university stated that
no patients were harmed to its knowledge, 357 it stretches the bounds of
credibility to believe that the control group's survival chances were not
negatively affected. The human subject protection laws failed these
patients. 358
The vulnerability of the patient/subject is exponentially
increased when the patient receives an unproven therapy outside of the
research context. These patients and their families are unprotected by
the enhanced human subject protections associated with research. They
are, in essence, "sitting ducks" for providers who proffer the therapy.
For example, HDC/ASCR has been sought by legions of desperately ill
women, either unaware of or unwilling to accept that the therapy is
unproven. 359 In addition to proving valueless, now that more data is
emerging, 360 this risk-ridden treatment may have had the effect of both
shortening lives and destroying the quality of the limited time these
patients had left.36 ' In a 362
significant percentage of these cases, doctors
have failed their patients.
352

For example, the risk of being in a study without adequate protections or in vhich the

data will
353be falsified or altered. See discussion infra at pp. 474-77.

See Kolata & Eichenwald, supra note 24, at A3.

3'4See Boodman, supranote 116, at Z12 (discussing case of Gail Reines).
355See Nelson & Weiss, supranote 307, at Al.
356
See Waldholz, supranote 138, at B7.
3

57See id
358In the aftermath, the discussion has focused on enhancing the protection and making
them the laws and regulations even more protective to protect against such abuses in the future.
See notes
359 302 & 307, supra and accompanying text.
See notes 331 & 332, supra and accompanying text.
3

69See id.

361See Neergaard, supra note 326, at A2.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:441

The uncontrolled access to unproven therapies like HDC/ASCR
ultimately damages society at large. Because of premature use of
HIDC/ASCR, many more women received this dangerous unproven
therapy than would have had it been subjected to traditional principled
research.363 Its unfettered use outside the research context derailed the
research effort, and accrual of scientifically valid data was ultimately
delayed.3 64
Indirect Participants in the Research Enterprise:
The Third Party Payers
Unlike most other industrialized nations, the United States does not
have universal access to health care services. 365 Other nations, in
to
having to formulate a system to provide health care to all, have had 366
benefits.
of
package
reasonable
a
to
develop a consensus as
Unfortunately, we have not had the need or the discipline to follow this
example. The consensus that currently exists with regard to the
parameters of coverage is limited to Medicare, Medicaid and private
health plans.367 Over time, we have seen a trend toward inclusion with
regard to preventive medical care, but little progress in other domains
has been achieved.368
Health plans, whether public or private, seek to avoid paying for
369
unproven or speculative treatments that are viewed as unnecessary.
The primary method of excluding such services is via "experimental"
exclusion clauses. 370 On balance, these exclusions have proven feeble

362Indeed if patients who are contemplating a procedure that is of unproven efficacy, the
physician has a duty to inform them of its experimental nature. If the physician indicates that
there is an unsubstantiated benefit, then the physician breached the standard of care with
respect363
to full disclosure and informed consent. See Tonelli, supra note 7, at 35.
See Zujewski, supra note 120, at 200-08; See Kolata & Eichenwald, supra note 24, at
A6.
364See Zujewski, supra note 120, at 200-08. See also Tonelli, supra note 7, at 35
(discussing same phenomenon occurring in context of lung volume reduction surgery).
" 365
3 5ee Inglehart, supranote 12, at 72.
Even in these systems however, coverage disputes arise with respect to new treatments
See Jost, supra note 4, at 644.
and technologies.
367See notes 191-93, supra,and accompanying text.
368
5ee discussion, supra,at pp. 471-73.
369
See discussion, supra,at pp. 460-62.

370

5ee notes 191-93, supra,and accompanying text.
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in courts of law. 371 They have also resulted in public relations disasters

when used to deny care to a pitiable beneficiary. 3 72 In recent years,
payers, particularly in the private sector, have opted to cover the cost of
these unproven therapies rather than engage in costly courtroom and
media battles.373 Furthermore, isolating costs associated with research
from costs not associated with research is administratively difficult and
costly. 374 Because of this difficulty, both Medicare
and private payers
375

pay for a large proportion of research related costs.
Recently, there has been increasing willingness of third party
payers to assume the costs of services, especially routine services
associated with research.3 76 Medicare currently covers routine patient
care costs associated with research involving a "category B"
investigational device.377 Medicare also covers costs of research for
certain new procedures subject to special conditions.37 In addition,
both the Department of Defense's TRICARE program and the
Department of Veterans' Affairs
cover medical costs associated with
379
trials.
research
cancer
NCI
With regard to private payers, the American Association of Health
Plans encourages its health plans to reimburse the routine costs of care
associated with NIH sponsored trials.380 Several plans, namely United
Health Group, 311 Aetna-U.S. Healthcare, 8 2 and Blue Cross and Blue
Shield have agreed to reimburse for care in cancer research trial
conducted under the NC.383 Noteworthy, however, is the fact that

371See discussion, supra at pp. 460-65.

Courts err and order payment for not only
unproven,
but dangerous therapies. See Tonelli, supra note 7, at 35.
3

nSee Weinstein, supra note 247, at 10.
37See id

374See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 42.
75

3 See id, at 42-43.
376See id

37See id at 33-34.
37See id at 36.
379See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 45.
3
SOSee id, at 46.

"3'SeeWeighing the Cost, BEST'S REvM'--LIFE-HEALTH Ih;SULurcE EDo:m, Mar 1,
1999, at 40; Clinical Trial: PromisingDecisionfrom New Jersey, Am,. MED. NEW, Jan 31,

2000, <http'J/www/ama-assn.orgfsci-pubsamnevs>.
3"2See Boodman, supranote116, at Z12.
38See Terry, supranote 6, at 124.
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many of these offers have not been accepted. 38 4 But this avowed
willingness of payers to cover research costs begs the question of
whether our public and private payers should be paying for clinical
research.
Balancing the Risks and Benefits
with the Responsibility to Pay
Parties in the research enterprise have conflicting interests, and the
risks and benefits of research are not evenly spread among the
participants. Given those circumstances, those who benefit the most
should be responsible for the majority of the cost, and those who
assume the most risk should be absolved from covering the cost.
In the case of pharmaceutical and device research, private industry
should cover the costs associated with research, because ultimately they
will make a profit from the product. Subjects in pharmaceutical and
device clinical trials assume the risk of treatment with an unproven
experimental modality. In a Phase III trial, they also bear the risk of
not receiving the new therapy if they are in the control group. Most
subjects will not realize any personal health benefit from participation
in the trial. Because of their contribution in term of risk-bearing,
subjects should be insulated from the costs associated with research.
However, society at large will benefit from safe efficacious products.
Therefore, it is reasonable for third party payers to cover routine patient
costs incurred during a clinical research trial, even when the research is
funded by the private sector. Many of the these routine costs would
have been incurred by the patient/subject for treatment of their
underlying disorder in any case. Thus, the payer in most cases is
assuming, at most, only a nominal increase in costs. 385 Moreover, since
'34Attempts of health plans to funnel patients to appropriate clinical trials have been

rebuffed. United HealthCare reports that few patients have chosen to enroll in the trials,
despite the willingness of the HMO to cover the costs. See IOM Report, supra note 11, at 46;

Marchione, supra note 245, at 1. One health plan attempted to refer a breast cancer patient to a
clinical trial, but was almost immediately countered with a threat of suit. See Holoweiko, supra

note 208, at 38. The patient's attorney argued that the randomized clinical trial was no better
than a "lottery ticket" and received major press coverage. See id. The health plan chose to pay

rather than go to court. See id.
385Several studies have found the cost of participation in trials only marginally higher
than the costs of patient care outside of the trial. For example, a study done at the Mayo Clinic

found only a 3-13 percent increase in cost of care for patient in a trial. Similarly, a study done
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much of research is funded either by federal tax dollars or revenue from
product sales to the public, coverage of the costs of research is
consistent with rather than contradictory to the public interest. In fact,
the IOM has38recently
recommended that Medicare cover such routine
6
patient costs.

The long-range public benefit argument, however, is not as
persuasive where private health plans are concerned. Private health
plans sell a product that is price-dependent and subject to intense
competition.3 87 The private health plan usually has a fiduciary duty to
its employer client to contain costs in the present, rather than devote
resources to research whose benefits will come to fruition in the distant
future. The employer is seeking or financing a product that cares for its
workforce today in the most economical and comprehensive fashion.
When additional coverage is added or mandated, the net result will be
increased premium costs that may cause employers and individuals on
the margin to not purchase coverage, thereby increasing the number of
uninsured.
However, even in the context of private health plans, there is
benefit inherent in improved therapies sufficient to warrant their
assuming the burden for the routine patient care costs associated with
clinical research. This assumption of routine patient costs should not
be extended to cover the cost of the experimental device or drug,
however. That cost should be borne by the manufacturer who will
ultimately profit from the new therapy.
Research involving procedures presents more complex issues,
from monitored NIH trials conducted by principled researchers 3 3Sto
uncontrolled use of unproven speculative treatment offered by
overeager providers in an increasingly entrepreneurial health care
industry.389 In the former case, risks and benefits are distributed in the
same way as in the case of pharmaceutical research. Here however, the
downstream profits will be made by the providers of this therapy once
with the Kaiser Permanente plan found only about a 10 percent differential. Sce IOM Report,
supra note
3 6 11, at 26.
' See id. Medicare already covers these routine patient costs in the context of most
investigational devices. See discussion, supra, at p. 472-73.
37See discussion, supra,at p. 459-61.
388See discussion, supra,at p. 448-49.
39
SSee id
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it is part of the established treatment regimens. In addition, they will
also win academic kudos for the publications the research produces. In
the case of a federally or privately funded clinical trial, the provider
may realize compensation through the funding and salary support
provided by the grant. However, commensurate with the benefits they
will receive in the foreseeable future, researchers should be foreclosed
from seeking coverage from third party payers for performing the
experimental procedure. Once again however, public policy is served
by having payers cover other routine patient costs incurred. And once
again, the patient who is the ultimate risk-bearer should be insulated
from research-related costs.
The recent IOM report has recommended that research procedure
costs should be paid for by Medicare when the procedure is done in a
randomized trial, equivalent to a phase III trial in the pharmaceutical
context. 390 This however unfairly rewards providers for engaging in
research, and provides a financial incentive for premature use of
unproven, but remunerative, procedures. Moreover, it is out of
synchrony with the policy with respect to pharmaceuticals, where such
premature windfalls are eschewed and human subjects protections are
enhanced by FDA requirements.
Finally there is the problematic category of research that is not
research at all, but rather use of an unproven therapy or speculative
procedure in a traditional provider-patient transaction. There is no
public health benefit here. Indeed, one can argue that patients may be
unnecessarily put at risk by cavalier use of unproven therapies. The
integrity of legitimate research is subverted by premature unprincipled
use of an unproven procedure. The progress of legitimate research may
be delayed, and harm to patients is likely, if not inevitable.
Patients, no matter how much they want the unproven procedure,
are in a poor position to judge safety and efficacy. Often they are
desperate, vulnerable patients offered a "last best hope" by a provider
who has not necessarily critically reviewed the science. This is not
quality medical care, nor is it respectful of patients. In the worst
possible scenario, the patient is offered this therapy by a provider who,

3

9gSee IOM Report, supranote 11, at 56-57.
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though cognizant of the uncertain benefit, seeks to realize a profit by
performing an expensive procedure.
There is no valid reason for third party payers, public or private, to
be a party to this exploitation of patients. In the case of the public
payers, there is no downstream public good that merits the use of tax
dollars. Similarly, reasons for private health plans to pay for unproven
procedures performed outside the research context are virtually
nonexistent. In fact, in the case of both public and private payers, there
is a duty to not pay for this exploitation of patients.
CONCLUSION
There is a broad spectrum of innovation that is frequently referred to as
research. In reality, however, legitimate clinical research is limited to
interventions that are undertaken in the furtherance of science and
medical progress, where the benefit will usually not be experienced by
the subject. This often is at odds with the subject's perception that
he/she vill realize some, at least marginal, benefit. A researcher's duty
is to clarify this fundamental issue when recruiting and obtaining a
subject's consent. In the course of legitimate research, subjects should
be insulated from costs. Routine patient care costs should be absorbed
by third-party payers and research-related costs should be borne by the
party who will realize benefit when the drug, device, biologic or
procedure has become the standard of care. These research protocolrelated costs are properly allocated to the pharmaceutical or device
manufacturer or, in the case of procedure research, to federal or other
funding entity, researcher/provider, and institution sponsoring the
research.
Unfortunately, most of the criticisms of inadequate funding for
experimental therapies do not ultimately reflect concerns about
legitimate clinical research. Rather, they concern innovative, unproven
therapies sought by patients and providers who are out of options in
treating a terminal or incurable disorder. Patients present a compelling
and sympathetic case: they are suffering, usually dying, and will take
any "last best hope." But, their argument for a last chance does not
justify holding the health care system and it resources hostage, nor does
it justify sacrificing the opportunity for legitimate clinical research and
adequate study of the innovation prior to marketing. This is precisely

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:441

what has occurred in the case of both the HDC/ASCR treatment for
breast cancer and LVRC for emphysema.
While patients present a sympathetic, albeit unsupportable case
regarding unproven treatments, providers are far less sympathetic.
"Patients may be easily persuaded by glowing reports of dramatic
3 91
medical breakthroughs, but physicians...should know better.
Physicians have a duty to refrain from offering innovative, unproven
therapies to patients outside a legitimate clinical trial. Physicians are
the most likely to open the door to a new therapy, but are also the best
equipped to close the door. Rather than engaging in a "dance of
denial" 392 with the vulnerable patient, physicians owe patients honest,
well-researched and critically reviewed assessments of treatment
possibilities. Unfortunately, there will be situations where no viable
treatment option exists.
Providers should be foreclosed from accessing third-party
reimbursement for unproven therapies outside the confines of
legitimate clinical research. Aside from the obvious misallocation 393
of
limited resources, there are profound conflict of interest questions.
Absent coverage and reimbursement, there is substantially less chance
of unproven therapies being unleashed on the unsuspecting and needy
market. Society does not tolerate such irresponsibility from
pharmaceutical firms, and, likewise, should not tolerate it with respect
to procedures and other treatments. To continue to do so will
ultimately cause greater harm to greater numbers of patients, waste
increasingly limited resources, further undermine the medical
profession's ethical standards, and diminish the integrity of research.

391

See Tonelli, supranote 7, at 35.

392See Goodman, supra note 314, at B7.

393It is perhaps ironic that the financial conflict of interest question has been aimed
primarily at health plans rather than at institutions and providers eager to offer unproven
therapies for profit. See discussion, supra, at p. 475-78. In the case of provider conflicts,

motivating profit may be direct, as in the case of Response Oncology, see id, or indirect, as in
using the unproven therapy as a "cash cow" to offset less profitable therapies, see Kolata &
Eichenwald, supra note 24, at A6.

